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ABSTRACT
CHANGES IN NAVY LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE: POST-VIETNAM 
Since the Vietnam War, Navy leadership theory and practice has changed, 
becoming more like current civilian leadership theory and practice than traditional military 
leadership o f old. Indicators of this alteration have been seen in journal writings, the new 
Navy performance evaluation structure, current Navy leadership training, and by the birth 
of a Navy Command Leadership School.
This study was designed to explore the evolution and recent history of the Navy’s 
leadership theory and practice for indications of change. Combining a qualitative and 
quantitative methodology, this study used a 5-point Likert-type scale survey that included 
a written comments section. Over 70 % of 561 participants responded to the survey’s 
open-ended questions, adding explanatory power to the quantitative data.
The findings in this study show that Tailhook was viewed as a major event 
associated with the changes in Navy leadership since the Vietnam War. Of the two 
participant groups surveyed, Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam Navy officers and senior 
enlisted veterans, Vietnam-era aviators felt the strongest in this belief. Vietnam-era 
veterans believed that the change had not been for the good of the Navy, whereas active 
duty personnel were much more favorable in their assessment about changes in leadership. 
Women showed significantly greater agreement that change in Navy leadership theory and 
practice during their time on active duty was for the good of the Navy, and whites
iii
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expressed a more favorable attitude to the direction Navy leadership was taking than non­
whites.
Other contributors to change in Navy leadership since Vietnam were the post-CoId 
War force drawdown and technological advacements o f the 1990s. Changes in Navy 
leadership were perceived differently depending on participants’ race, gender, or rank— 
usually only varying in degree of agreement or disagreement with certain aspects of Navy 
leadership.
What started as a gradual change in Navy leadership theory and practice 
accelerated after the 1991 Tailhook Convention scandal. Tailhook was a watershed event 
that sent shock waves throughout the Navy hierarchy. The event and its aftermath forced 
the Navy to change how it viewed the role of women in combat. To some, Tailhook 
represented a quintessential breakdown in Navy leadership.
TV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
© Copyright by 
NICHOLAS A  TRONGALE 
2001
V
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Dedication
To my wife Kate, my children Danny and Megan, and my mother for their love and 
support, and to the United States Navy for 21 fantastic years filled with opportunity and 
challenge.
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Preface
I would like to acknowledge and thank my dissertation director, Dr. Mary Scherr, 
PhD., and my dissertation committee  members, Dr. Fred Galloway, Ed.D., and Dr. Daniel 
Miller, PhD ., for their expert guidance throughout tny pursuit o f this doctoral degree, and 
for their understanding o f the scope of my primary job and constraints 1 was living under 
in the Pacific Northwest and being out to sea for the majority o f this dissertation process. 
Without their help and support I still would be trying to complete this dissertation. I 
would also like to thank Dean Paula Cordeiro, Ed.D., for her help and counsel during my 
studies at the University of San Diego; Dr. Janet Littrell, EdJD., who was instrumental in 
starting me off in the right direction in the leadership program by supporting a studies 
template that did not look achievable to anyone but us; Dr. William Howe, EH, PhD., for 
his mentoring, and for his ability to meld teaching leadership with practicing it; to Dr. 
Marie Thomas, PhD., for her immensely valuable analytical assistance in this study; and to 
Bev Callaway for her ability to merge the myriad of elements necessary to form a 
dissertation.
I would also like to thank Sr. Terri Monroe, RSCJ, for all her support and interest 
in this study; those members o f the United States Navy, past and present, who participated 
in the survey, particularly the Vietnam-era veterans who had the courage to tell it like they 
saw it, and in many cases, signed their name to their comments. Lastly, I would like to
vii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
thank the countless other individuals who assisted me during my pursuit o f this epic 
undertaking—individuals that I cannot mention by name and still ensure anonymity.
viii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE CHANGES IN NAVY LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
POST-VIETNAM.........................................................................................................I
The Problem............................................................................................................... 5
The 1991 Tailhook ScandaL.................................. 5
Post-Cold War Drawdown................................................................................ 8
Purpose of the Study.................................................................................................11
Research Questions...................................................................................................II
Significance of the Study.......................................................................................... 11
Methodology.............................................................................................................12
Study Objectives........................................................................................................13
Discussion of Terms Used in the Study.....................................................................13
CHAPTER TWO REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE........................................... 17
Civilian Leadership Theory....................................................................................... 17
Military Leadership Theory....................................................................................... 19
Practical Applications o f Leadership Theory............................................................24
CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY.......................................................................... 27
Introduction.............................................................................................................. 27
Research Questions and Design Overview................................................................27




Triangulation Methodology and Survey Participants....................................... 35
Non-response Bias............................................................................................41
Data Analysis............................................................................................................ 42
Ethical Considerations: The Committee for the Protection o f Human Subjects.45
Entry, Access, and Document Collection.........................................................45
Limitations............................................................................................................... 46
Role o f the Researcher.............................................................................................. 47
CHAPTER FOUR RESULTS..........................................................................................48
The Nature of Leadership.........................................................................................49
Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership...........................................................54
Has Navy Leadership Changed?............................................................................... 59




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Drawdown........................................................................................................ 76
Tailhook Versus Drawdown............................................................................. 77
Significant Events and Years............................................................................ 77
CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................... 79
Purpose..................................................................................................................... 79
Methodology............................................................................................................. 79
Summary of Findings................................................................................................ 81
Tailhook...........................................................................................................83
End of the Cold War/Drawdown..................................................................... 85
Information Technology....................................................................................86
Recommendations.................................................................................................... 86
Areas for Future Research........................................................................................ 87
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................89
APPENDIX A SAMPLE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FORM............................. 96
APPENDIX B PILOT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS........................................................97
APPENDIX C LEADERSHIP SURVEY........................................................................ 98
APPENDIX D CONSENT TO ACT AS AN INTERVIEW RESEARCH
PARTICIPANT......................................................................................................... 102
APPENDIX E CONSENT TO ACT AS A SURVEY RESEARCH PARTICIPANT ... 103
APPENDIX F LETTER TO MILITARY COMMANDERS......................................... 104
APPENDIX G LETTER TO VETERANS GROUPS.................................................... 105
APPENDIX H LEADERSHIP SURVEY ITEM FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS ... 106
APPENDIX I LEADERSHIP SURVEY USING UNWEIGHTED POST-VIETNAM 
DATA....................................................................................................................... 119
APPENDIX J SURVEY COMMENTS..........................................................................135







Women in Combat.......................................................................................... 141
Tailhook.......................................................................................................... 143
Leadership Similar to Civilian Management....................................................145
X
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Post-Cold War Drawdown............................................................................. 146
Why Leadership Has Changed.........................................................................147
Leadership Training.........................................................................................147





Lack of Vision................................................................................................. 153
Leadership Training.........................................................................................153
Pleased With Navy Leadership........................................................................154




Tailhook Was Significant................................................................................ 160
Leadership More Like Civilian Management.................................................. 161
Post-Cold War Drawdown..............................................................................162
Cumulative Events.......................................................................................... 165
Meaning of "Warrior"..................................................................................... 166
Navy is Too Political.......................................................................................167
xi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Gender, Rank, and Race/Ethnicity Breakdowns for Post-Vietnam Sample......... 39
Table 2 Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam 
Samples.......................................................................................................................50
Table 3 Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples........ 51
Table 4 Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay 
Grade/Rank.................................................................................................................52
Table 5 Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items:
Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples..................................................................... 55
Table 6 Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership: Post-Vietnam 
Samples.......................................................................................................................56
Table 7 Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: Post- 
Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank......................................................................... 57
Table 8 Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-
Vietnam Samples........................................................................................................ 61
Table 9 Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples........ 63
Table 10 Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples by 
Pay Grade/Rank.......................................................................................................... 65
Table 11 Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items:
Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples..................................................................... 69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Table 12 Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Post- 
Vietnam Samples........................................................................................................ 71
Table 13 Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Post- 
Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank......................................................................... 73
Table H-l Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Vietnam-era Participants. 107
Table H-2 Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Weighted Post-Vietnam 
Sample....................................................................................................................... I l l
Table H-3 Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Unweighted Post-Vietnam 
Sample....................................................................................................................... 115
Table 1-1 Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and
Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples...........................................................................120
Table 1-2 Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam 
Samples..................................................................................................................... 121
Table 1-3 Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam 
Samples by Pay Grade/Rank...................................................................................... 122
Table 1-4 Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: 
Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples...............................................123
Table 1-5 Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership: Unweighted
Post-Vietnam Samples.............................................................................................. 124
Table 1-6 Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: 
Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank...........................................125
Table 1-7 Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and
Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples...........................................................................126
Table 1-8 Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam 
Samples..................................................................................................................... 127
X111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Table 1-9 Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam 
Samples by Pay Grade/Rank...................................................................................... 129
Table 1-10 Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: 
Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples............................................... 130
Table 1-11 Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: 
Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples........................................................................... 132
Table 1-12 Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: 
Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples by Pay Grade/Rank...........................................134
X IV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Figure I Triangulation Methodology................................................................................ 43
XV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
CHAPTER ONE CHANGES IN NAVY LEADERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE:
POST-VIETNAM
A review of official Navy documents indicated that since the Vietnam War, Navy 
leadership theory and practice appear to be changing, becoming more like current civilian 
leadership theory and practice. Indicators o f this convergence can be seen in journal 
writings, the new Navy performance evaluation structure, current Navy leadership 
training, and by the birth of a Navy Command Leadership School. However, these are 
recent changes. For an officer in the early 1980s, technical competence appeared to be a 
more important quality than leadership ability. Leadership training was viewed as a way 
for officers to improve themselves. It was the responsibility of the commanding officer to 
ensure that leadership training was conducted and to teach leadership through example. 
Only after officers were qualified and trained for their primary responsibility was it deemed 
time for leadership training (Mack & Konetzni, 1982).
The importance of leadership was downplayed elsewhere in the Navy at this time, 
too. Admiral Rickover, best known as the father of the nuclear Navy and his less than 
conventional approach to leadership practice, saw little utility in what officers were 
writing about leadership. In 1981, Rickover suggested that
Leadership is an esoteric concept which cannot be defined—particularly by young 
and immature officers. I recommend that the Naval Institute call a hiatus on 
leadership articles for a decade or so. No harm will be done to the U. S. Navy or
1
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the commonwealth. In fact, some good may ensue. Readers of the Proceedings
(the Naval Institute’s magazine) will not be faced with more of the same
sophomoric drivel (Mack & Konetzni, 1982, p. 146).
Mack and Konetzni (1982) shared Rickover’s view that naval officers of that era 
had little to add to the field o f leadership studies. Leadership was “the subject of hundreds 
of books and thousands of lectures and articles, yet every naval officer fancies himself an 
expert on the subject. Few are” (p. 146).
There were other indications that, perhaps for officers, leadership was secondary 
to technical knowledge. It was not until 1995 that a reporting senior officer was required 
to grade a subordinate officer’s leadership ability based on periodic formal evaluations.
The same evaluations were used by promotion boards that selected officers for their next 
higher rank, and by selection boards that selected officers for command. The Navy’s old 
evaluation form, which was used from the mid-70s until July 1995, did not have a block 
for leadership. Reporting seniors were encouraged to remark on the subordinate officer’s 
overall leadership ability and estimated or actual performance in combat in the comments 
section of the performance evaluation form, but they were not required to do so. Any 
mention of leadership was purely at the discretion of the reporting senior. In 1995, the 
new performance evaluation form (see Appendix A) was implemented for officers and 
chief petty officers. Reporting seniors were now required to evaluate a subordinate’s 
leadership ability-defined on the form as organizing, motivating, and developing others to 
accomplish goals. Leadership and six other performance traits (professional expertise, 
equal opportunity, military bearing/character, teamwork, mission accomplishment and 
initiative, and tactical performance) were graded on a 5.0 scale with 1.0 being below
2
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standards, 2.0 progressing, 3.0 meets standards, 4.0 above standards, and 5.0 greatly
exceeds standards.
The mid-1990s also appeared to usher in a new Navy philosophy vis-a-vis 
leadership training. A 1992 Navy-wide personnel survey highlighted that leadership 
training was insufficient (Hollingsworth, 1996). Soon after that survey was conducted, 
Thomas, Perry, and David (1994) noted the following: “The career histories of women 
warfare officers should be reviewed to ensure that women and men receive equivalent 
developmental assignments and leadership training” (p. 20). The recommendation was 
based on their analysis of the narrative section o f240 performance evaluation forms for 
each gender that showed that commanding officers were not placing women warfare 
officers in assignments in their ships and squadrons that were traditionally thought of as 
leadership positions. They further concluded, "Leadership was the only area of 
performance in which women were rated significantly lower than men” (p. vii).
Subsequent to the Navy-wide survey and report by Thomas, Perry, and David 
(1994), the Navy changed its evaluation criteria and made it mandatory to grade the 
leadership ability of all officers and senior enlisted. The Navy also established a Command 
Leadership School in Newport, Rhode Island. Addressed in the school’s central course, 
Command Leadership, was the necessity for leading change. The school teaches its 
prospective commanding officers Kenneth Blanchard’s situational leadership model and 
transformation leadership theory (Chief ofNaval Education and Training, 1997). 
Transactional, transformational, and situational leadership are taught to lower ranking 
officers and senior enlisted personnel during the Navy’s Intermediate Officer Leadership
3
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Course, giving further credence to the notion that Navy leadership theory and practice are 
changing (Chief o f Naval Education and Training, 1996).
In September 1998, the Chief ofNaval Operations (1998a) established a policy 
requiring that all service members attend and successfully complete the requisite 
leadership-training course for the appropriate stage of their careers. For example, formal 
leadership schoolhouse tr a in in g  would take place within the first 2 years after 
commissioning, at the 7 to 9-year point, the 11 to 14-year point, and the 15 to 21-year- 
point in an officer’s career.
Three months after the Navy made it mandatory for all personnel to successfully 
complete formal leadership training at certain milestone points in their careers, the Chief of 
Naval Operations announced the establishment of a Permanent Military Professor (PMP) 
Program (1998b). The PMP Program was established to take officers out of their normal 
areas of expertise, whether it was surface warfare, aviation, submarine warfare, etc., and 
make them permanent professors at the Naval Academy. The PMP Program established 
five different leadership areas: military sociology, industrial/organizational psychology, 
social psychology, organizational behavior, and organizational studies. If an officer was 
selected for the program and did not already possess a Ph.D., the Navy would send him or 
her, depending on the area of leadership studies required, to Georgia Tech, University of 
Southern California, Duke, Yale, Harvard, Case Western Reserve, Northwestern, George 
Washington, or Boston College. Upon completing the fully funded degree, the officer 
would be obligated to serve as a professor until reaching statutory retirement (28 years for 
the rank of commander (0-5) and 30 years for the rank of captain, (0-6)).
4
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The Problem
A review of official Navy documents indicated that Navy leadership theory and 
practice have changed since Vietnam. However, the researcher was unable to find 
quantitative data that assessed the perception of change in Navy leadership since the 
Vietnam War among Navy personnel. The researcher was also unable to find data that 
either supported or did not support the notion that change in Navy leadership since 
Vietnam can be attributed to any one significant social or world event, such as the 1991 
Tailhook scandal (Tailhook) or the post-CoId War drawdown. Nevertheless, both 
Tailhook and the post-Cold War drawdown were consequential social and national events 
that effected the United States Navy, warrenting further discussion.
The 1991 Tailhook Scandal
Tailhook was a significant event that negatively affected how the American people 
viewed the Navy and particularly naval aviators. It represented a breakdown in naval 
leadership that was illustrated in two ways: by a culture that supported and nurtured 
patterns of behavior that led to the scandal, and by the method in which senior Navy 
personnel dealt with the scandal. Tailhook was a watershed event that sent shock waves 
throughout the Navy hierarchy. Still backpedaling from the aftermath of Tailhook, 
seemingly overnight the Navy was forced to change how it viewed the role of women in 
combat in the military (Vistica, 1997). To some, Tailhook represented the quintessential 
breakdown in Navy leadership, forcing a near decade of zero tolerance for mistakes by 
anyone at any level. Ironically, the breakdown of leadership did not happen in battle on the 
high seas; it happened in Las Vegas, Nevada. The scandal itself was a result of
5
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molestations and acts o f indecency that occurred at the 35th Annual Tailhook Symposium,
which 4,000 naval officers attended in September 1991.
The 1991 Tailhook scandal had a major impact on Navy leadership, if for no other 
reason than the sheer media and congressional scrutiny the Navy sustained on account of 
the incident. However, no empirical data that attempts to estimate Tailhook’s impact on 
the United States Navy is currently available. Opinions range from Tailhook being the 
worst catastrophe to confront the Navy since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
(Vistica, 1997) to the possible erosion o f proper civil-military relations (McMichael,
1997). What was Tailhook and how did it happen?
The Tailhook Association, a private, nonprofit, social/professional organization of 
naval aviators, contractors, and others involved in naval aviation, hosted an annual 
professional conference each year in Las Vegas. Full membership in the Tailhook 
Association is open to anyone who has achieved at least one carrier landing; associate 
membership is open to anyone interested in furthering the cause of naval aviation (The 
Tailhook Association, 1998). The Association had been the host of the annual event at the 
Las Vegas Hilton for decades and received full support from the Navy (McMichael, 1997; 
Office of the Inspector General, 1993).
According to the Office of the Inspector General (1993), the Navy supplied expert 
briefers and technical information for symposium events, allowed officers to attend the 
symposium without taking leave (and, in some cases, even made it mandatory for 
individuals to attend), and supplied air transportation to Las Vegas for those interested in 
attending the event. The official responses to the acts, which received extensive press
6
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coverage, included Congressional scrutiny and public outrage over the nature of the
offenses (Mitchell, 1997; Office of the Inspector General, 1993).
The chain of events that exposed the incidents started when Lieutenant Paula 
Coughlin, assaulted during the night’s activities of partying on the third floor o f the Hilton, 
reported the incident to her superior in accordance with the Navy’s sexual harassment 
policy (Mitchell, 1997; Vistica, 1997). Lieutenant Coughlin was a helicopter pilot and the 
personal aide to Admiral Jack Snyder, then commander of Patuxent River Naval Air Test 
Center (home of the Navy’s test pilot school). As Mitchell and Vistica explained, Snyder 
did little or nothing about the incident that Coughlin reported to him. Frustrated with the 
system and feeling betrayed by her fellow aviators, Coughlin filed an official charge.
It was not until a month after the incident and only after an impending article by 
The San Diego Union newspaper about the wrongdoing, did then Secretary of the Navy, 
Lawrence Garrett, take action (McMichael, 1997). According to McMichael, Garrett 
ordered the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) to look into the allegations. After a lengthy 
investigation, NIS uncovered that 26 women, about half of them naval officers, had been 
assaulted; two suspects were identified. The NIS concluded there was a definite cover-up 
of events and wrongdoings. NIS had received little or no cooperation from the aviators 
they questioned (Office of the Inspector General, 1993; Vistica, 1997).
With Congress and the public not satisfied with the findings, the Office of the 
Inspector General was put on the case. After another lengthy investigation, files on 140 
individuals were referred back to the Navy by the Office of the Inspector General for 
further investigation and possible courts-martial or disciplinary action (Office o f the 
Inspector General, 1993). Of the 140 individuals charged of wrong doings, only one
7
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underwent court-martial proceedings and was subsequently acquitted. All of the remaining 
139 individuals formally implicated by Tailhook were cleared of criminal charges due to 
lack o f substantial evidence. McMichael (1997) suggested that Congress was extremely 
frustrated by the prosecution’s results and by what it perceived as stonewalling on the part 
of the Navy. Many in Congress, particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee, felt 
that more officers should have been punished. Unable to punish the officers directly, 
Congress (responsible for the approval o f military officer promotions) retained the names 
of Tailhook attendees and rejected every Navy promotion list (names of officers who 
qualified for promotion) that contained the name of any of the 139 officers who attended 
Tailhook regardless of the fact that the officers were cleared of all criminal charges. 
According to McMichael, the Navy was forced to deny promotion to any individual who 
was on Congress’ list; the list included many more officers than were formally charged 
with offenses.
Post-Cold War Drawdown.
The post-Cold War drawdown was the result of the demise of the Soviet Union. 
The collapse o f the Soviet Union marked the end of open hostilities between two super 
powers—hostilities based on ideological differences, mistrust, and fears of aggression. In 
one camp was the Soviet Union,, representing world communism In the other camp, the 
United States fought for world democracy. The Cold War was characterized as a 
continuous threat of world annihilation by nuclear weapons. The last decade of the 20th 
century ushered in the end of the Soviet Union and the bi-polar world that had existed for 
50 years (Kennedy, 1997). It also represented the end of a Cold War-sized military by the 
United States. According to Spence (1998), during the past decade, the United States
8
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military was reduced from approximately 2.2 million active duty service men and women
to 1.4 million active duty sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen. The reduction in military-
related spending was managed primarily by eliminating jobs. The Department of Defense
cut in excess of 100,000 uniformed men and women each year and 45,000 civilian
personnel from 1990 to 1995 alone (Peters, 1996). Without personnel to fly, sail, or carry
rifles, the Department of Defense was forced to reduce Air Force Fighter Wings from 36
to 19, Army Divisions from 18 to 10, and Navy ships from 547 to 346 (Spence, 1998).
According to Government Executive (Anonymous, 1998), the post-Cold War drawdown
is not over yet. Secretary of Defense Cohen called for additional active duty military cuts
o f60,000 from 1999 to 2003 and two more rounds of base closures, one in 2001 and one
in 2005.
Many believe that the end of the Cold War did not lessen the world commitments 
and operational requirements of the United States military. For example, Barnes (1999) 
argued that since 1989 the Navy was reduced by 36% while operational commitments 
around the world have increased by 300%. This reduced force structure, along with 
increased world commitments, has led to personnel difficulties that translate to leadership 
challenges for the Navy. According to the Government Accounting Office (1997):
For 25 years the Navy has not properly assessed personnel requirements for its 
shore-based activities primarily because of the low priority that the Navy 
traditionally gave to managing the shore establishment, ineffective management 
and oversight of the shore establishment, and changes in program direction (p. 12). 
The effect of the drawdown translates to other leadership challenges vis-a-vis 
morale and retention. Reduced defense budgets lead to aircraft that cannot be flown due
9
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lack of spare parts; aircraft that have to be cannibalized to keep other aircraft flying; naval 
vessels that are undermarmed; and, aircraft, like the B-52, that are 45 years old. 
Maintenance personnel must work harder and longer hours to keep up with increased 
commitments (Barnes, 1999).
A survey of the Navy’s submarine force retention showed the number one reason 
(51.2%) submarine junior officers were leaving the Navy was quality of life, an area that 
directly related to the drawdown (Kennedy, 1997). However, according to Kennedy, only 
3.5% of all junior officer resignations were attributed to leadership. Kennedy believed that 
the difference between the large number of submariners who were leaving the Navy 
compared to the small percentage of submariners who were leaving because of poor 
leadership might have existed because leadership must review and endorse a departing 
officer’s resignation request.
Carretta (1998) summed up the quandary o f today’s Navy officers commissioned 
after 1991 as follows:
Today’s junior officers—those in year groups 1991 and later—have a different 
perspective. They are the post-drawdown, post-Tailhook officers who have 
witnessed the decline o f the U.S. Navy (and naval aviation in particular) since their 
days of active duty. They have never known anything but a shrinking Navy, with 
reduced career opportunities, fewer resources, and eroding benefits; therefore, 
they have little faith that the situation will improve. As they approach the end of 
their initial commitments, an alarming number are choosing to leave (p. 35).
10
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The remainder of this chapter briefly addresses the purpose of the study, the research
questions, significance of the study, methodology, the study objectives, and a discussion
of the terms used in the study.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to assess the perception of change in Navy
leadership since Vietnam; determine if any significant social or world event attributed to
changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam; and, to establish if the perception of change in
Navy leadership varied by race, gender, or rank.
Research Questions
The researcher explored the following three questions:
1. How, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice 
changed in the post-Vietnam history of the United States (1975-2000)?
2. How, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and 
practice varied by race, gender, or rank?
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam and post- 
Vietnam-era veteran’s perception of change in Navy leadership?
Significance o f the Study
This study is significant in the context of research on U.S. Navy leadership studies 
and important for many reasons. The following items are critical: (a) The entire United 
States Navy (not just those individuals who are responsible for leadership development 
and training) needs to identify and acknowledge that change in Navy leadership theory and 
practice has and/or is taking place; (b) the identified change needs to be analyzed to 
determine if it is acceptable and in line with the vision established by senior Navy leaders;
11
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(c) the desired change needs to be accepted by the entire Navy; and, (d) the Navy needs to 
understand the effect that significant events have on Navy leadership, near and long term. 
The aforementioned is important because change driven from without the organization 
may be resisted by Navy leaders. Further, change may have an overall detrimental impact 
on the organization if its leaders do not anticipate or account for the effects of change.
This may be especially true when change is driven by a significant negative event such as 
Tailhook.
Methodology
This study used both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to answer the 
three research questions. Two distinct groups of Navy veterans served as participants: 
Vietnam-era veterans and post-Vietnam veterans. Vietnam-era veterans included officers 
and senior enlisted who served in the Navy at any time during the Vietnam War but were 
not still on active duty in the year 2000. Post-Vietnam veterans were defined as officers 
and senior enlisted who served in the Navy after 1975, the end of the Vietnam War. The 
officer and senior enlisted participant population was chosen because they represent a 
group that was more than likely placed in leadership positions during their time in service 
and because of their seniority, not that the researcher feels that the lower enlisted rates do 
not exhibit or have knowledge of leadership.
Survey questions were developed from the results of the researcher’s review of 
pertinent documents and pilot interviews. The researcher collected documents on Navy 
leadership training, performance evaluations, and leadership award criteria. Then the 
researcher conducted four open-ended pilot interviews o f two officers and two senior 
enlisted. The pilot interview questions were derived from the researcher’s document and
12
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literature review. Based on the results o f these interviews and review of the collected
documents, a 5-point Likert-type scale survey was developed. The survey was distributed
to enough individuals to receive returns from 450 Navy officers and senior enlisted
personnel (150 Vietnam-era veterans and 300 post-Vietnam veterans). Both groups of
veterans were administered the exact same survey. To help ensure proportional
representation, the researcher sought to collect survey returns from post-Vietnam veterans
who mirrored the latest Navy demographic data available at the time of distribution. A 2-
month survey window was targeted and maintained. Again, based on demographics, an
effort was made to increase response rates for under represented categories; additional
surveys were administered to determine how, if at all, the perception of change in Navy
leadership theory and practice varied by race, gender, or rank.
Study Objectives
The objectives of the study were as follows: frame leadership in both a military and 
civilian context; examine how Navy leadership is viewed by Vietnam-era veterans and 
post-Vietnam veterans and compare the two; identify if the perception of change in Navy 
leadership varies by race, gender, or rank; and, identify any recurring themes that emerged 
from the interviews, events such as the 1991 Tailhook scandal.
Discussion of Terms Used in the Study
1. Military leadership: For the purpose of this study, military leadership was 
defined as a process that is purposeful and visionary, involving the organized search for 
changes, analysis, and the capacity to move resources from areas o f lesser to greater 
productivity.
13
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2. Civilian leadership: For the purpose of this study, civilian leadership was framed 
as presented by James MacGregor Burns (1978), Joseph Rost (1991), and others who 
define leadership in transformational and/or postindustrial paradigm terms, i.e., leadership 
that is collaborative, episodic, and intends significant change, or leadership that must 
respond to adaptive challenges as Ronald Heifetz (1994) suggests.
3. Tailhook Association: The Tailhook Association is a private, nonprofit 
social/professional organization of Naval aviators, civilian contractors, and others involved 
in promoting carrier aviation. For decades, Tailhook hosted its annual professional 
conference each year in Las Vegas. Up until the scandal o f Tailhook ’91, the association 
enjoyed the full support of the Navy.
4. Naval aviation: Naval aviation includes Navy and Marine Corps aviation. All 
naval aviators, Navy and Marine, receive exactly the same flight training up to the time 
they earn their wings.
5. Combat: The Navy defined combat in the context of combat missions. For the 
Navy, a combat mission is defined as a mission of an individual unit, ship or aircraft that 
individually, or collectively as a naval task organization; it has, as one of its primary 
objectives, to seek out, reconnoiter, and engage the enemy. The normal defensive posture 
of all operating units is not included within the definition. This definition resulted from the 
Navy’s 1987 study and the DOD’s study of Women in the Military that were conducted 
for the purpose of supporting the maximum assimilation o f women within the limits of the 
Combat Exclusion Law (Ebbert & Hall, 1993). For the purpose of this study, combat was 
defined as the act of engaging an enemy in armed conflict.
14
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6. Commanding officer The commanding officer is the individual who has absolute 
responsibility for his or her command and whose authority is commensurate with that 
responsibility.
7. Navy officer rank structure: The Navy officer rank structure, from bottom to 
top, is Chief Warrant Officer (W-l through W-4), Ensign (0-1), Lieutenant junior grade 
(0-2), Lieutenant (0-3), Lieutenant Commander (0-4), Commander (0-5), Captain (O- 
6), Rear Admiral lower half (0-7), Rear Admiral upper half (0-8), Vice Admiral (0-9), 
and Admiral (0-10).
8. Senior enlisted: For the purpose o f this study, senior enlisted refers to the 
enlisted rates of Chief Petty Officer (E-7), Senior Chief Petty Officer (E-8), and Master 
Chief Petty Officer (E-9).
9. Chain of command: Chain of command is the term referred to as the succession 
of officers through which command is exercised. For example, the chain of command for a 
seaman on a ship may resemble the following (from top to bottom): commanding officer, 
executive officer, department head, division officer, assistant division officer, division chief 
petty officer, division leading petty officer, and the individual seaman.
10. Total Quality Leadership (TQL): TQL has a very significant place in Navy 
history and was mentioned quite often by survey participants as an example of what 
leadership is not. However, TQL, the military’s version of W. Edward Deming’s Total 
Quality Management, is a management process designed to achieve quality through 
process improvement. How that process is implemented represents leadership in that it 
takes vision, team building, empowerment, and other sound leadership practices (FrieL, 
1999).
15
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In the next chapter the researcher presents a review of the related literature that
includes civilian leadership theory, m ilitary leadership theory, and the practical applications
of leadership theory.
16
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CHAPTER TWO REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
This chapter is a critical review of the research literature covering an overview o f 
civilian and military leadership that is followed by a section devoted to the practical 
application o f leadership theory.
Civilian Leadership Theory
The phenomenon of leadership is older than humankind itself. Allee (1945, 1951) 
concluded that all vertebrates that live in groups display social organization and 
leadership. Although the phenomenon of leadership predates humankind, its origin as a 
word did not appear until the first half of the 19* century. Therefore, leadership, being a 
relatively new concept, has nearly as many different definitions as there are people who 
have attempted to define the concept (Bass, 1981). Burns (1978) stated, “leadership is one 
of the most observed... phenomena on earth... it is one of the least understood” (p.2). 
Blackmar (1911) framed leadership as a point of polarization for group members; in turn, 
leadership focuses the attention and releases the energies of group members in a desired 
direction. Schenk (1928) defined leadership as “the management of men by persuasion and 
inspiration” (p. 110). Redl (1942) expanded on Blackmar’s findings and concluded that 
the leader is the focal person who integrates the group. Gibb (1954) defined leadership 
very simply by saying, ‘leadership is what leaders do in groups” (p. 884). Tanenbaum, 
Weshcler, and Massarik (1961) explained leadership in goal-oriented terms. For them 
leadership was an “interpersonal influence exercised in a situation and directed through the
17
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communication process, toward the attainment o f a specific goal or goals” (p. 21). Burns
(1978) broke away from mainstream leadership theory by defining leadership as “the
reciprocal process of mobilizing by persons with certain motives and values, various
economic, political and other resources, in a context o f competition and conflict, in order
to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers” (p. 425).
Bennis and Nanus (1985) heightened the importance o f morality as a component of
leadership. For them leadership was ‘ an influence relationship among leaders and
followers who intend real changes that morally elevate organizations and the people in
them” (p. 218). Bass (1985) called for a paradigm shift in leadership theory. Rost (1991)
answered Bass’ call with his postindustrial definition o f leadership. In his definition, Rost
made the distinction between management and leadership by elevating the role of the
collaborator, and eliminating the moral component o f leadership found in Bennis and
Nanus’ definition. Leadership for Rost was “an influence relationship among leaders and
followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes” (p. 102).
Heifetz (1994) departed from current transformational leadership theory 
altogether. He defined leadership as an activity rather than a societal position of authority 
or set o f personal characteristics. According to Heifetz and Laurie (1997), leadership is 
the responsibility o f every individual, at every level and should no longer be thought of as 
“the responsibility o f the few, a rare event, or a once in a lifetime opportunity” (p. 134). In 
an article based on their experiences with managers throughout the world, they move 
away from leadership theory that contends leadership requires a vision and the ability of 
one person to align his or her followers to that vision. For Heifetz and Laurie, the seminal 
challenge confronting leaders today is to lead adaptive work, i.e., mobilize individuals in
18
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organizations to do adaptive work. They delineate six principles for leading adaptive
work: getting to the balcony; identifying the adaptive challenge; regulating distress;
maintaining disciplined attention; giving the work back to people; and protecting the
voices o f leadership from below.
Heifetz (1997) addressed why leaders are removed from leadership positions.
According to Heifetz, the main reason leaders are removed from organizational life or
“killed in political life” (p. 63) is not because they take calculated risks. They are removed
from leadership positions because they fail to see that an action or course of action will get
them feed, or as Heifetz refers to, failing to stay alive. In excerpts from a seminar he
conducted at the Nieman Foundation in February 1997, Heifetz addressed two specific
actions that would assist a leader in staying alive. He stressed the importance of leaders
stepping back in the midst of an action and debriefing with a confidant about what went
right and what went wrong during the day’s events. Heifetz (1997) believed that these
routine acts of reflection would help protect a leader from getting blind-sided and
ultimately killed. Heifetz contended that although leadership requires the willingness to
die, “martyrdom is almost always futile and destructive to the public, to progress” (p. 69).
How civilians view military leadership has a direct correlation to their education
level. According to a University of Michigan study, the more highly educated a civilian is,
the lower he or she perceives a military leader’s competence to be (Bowers & Bachman,
1974).
Military Leadership Theory
Major writings about military leadership began with the Chinese classic The Art o f 
War by Sun Tzu and continue today (Bass, 1990). Jenkins (1947) reviewed 74 studies of
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military leaders and concluded that military leadership was a form of leadership that was
unique and specific to the military. Meyer (1980) called for rebirth in the concern for
military leadership. Believing that the military was becoming too preoccupied with
managing resources, he argued that the military leader must manage resources but not in
place of or at the expense of effective leadership. Since records were kept, leadership has
been considered a key factor to the success or failure of armed forces (Gal & Manning,
1987). Gal and Manning agreed with Meyer that leadership was important to the military.
They also concluded that better-led forces have repeatedly been more victorious than
poorly led forces.
Gal (1986) suggested that there is a post-World War II correlation between unit 
morale and the need to civilianize m ilitary leadership practice. He surveyed over 1,200 
Israeli combat soldiers for the purpose of exploring both the theoretical and practical 
aspects o f morale. He collected the data for his study in one month in 1981 using the 
Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire (CRMQ) and then analyzed the data by means of 
inter-correlations and factor analyses. The results of Gal’s study yielded several important 
conclusions to the study of military leadership:
1. Future military leaders would have to operate under conditions where there is 
less public consensus than existed in World War II.
2. Military leaders would be expected to know how to use minimal force in 
unconventional small-scale conflicts that are peace keeping in nature.
3. Military officers would be required to respond carefully to ambiguous 
circumstances.
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4. Officers would have to inspire subordinates with a vision of the future that
builds an atmosphere of loyalty and commitment rather than an environment o f blind 
obedience.
In his 1986 study, Gal also addressed the need for military leadership to become 
more collaborative when he predicted that military leadership in the 1990s would become 
more dependent on relationships and be based on the commitment of subordinates who 
rise to the challenge of complex, risky, uncertain, and dangerous situations.
Earlier in the 20th Century, the United States Military Academy (1925) defined 
leadership as “the art of imposing one’s will upon others in such a manner as to command 
their obedience, their confidence, their respect, and their loyal cooperation” (p. 102). In 
another pre-World War II document that was published by and for the Navy, leadership 
was defined in terms of the ability to influence one’s subordinates. According to that 
publication, “Leadership is that quality, inherent or acquired, in a person which enables 
him to achieve accomplishment from his subordinates by virtue of their willingness rather 
than force” (Tobin, 1939, p.l). The United States’ 1944 War Instructions (1996) defined 
leadership as “the art of inspiring, guiding, and directing bodies of men so that they 
ardently desire to do what the leader wishes” (p. 1-2-3). Admiral Rickover suggested that 
the principles of leadership are the same for the military as they are in business, the church, 
and elsewhere. In a 1981 letter to the U. S. Naval Institute’s magazine Proceedings, 
Rickover cited the following principles: learn your job; work hard at your job; train your 
people; and inspect frequently to see that the job is being done properly (Mack &
Konetzni, 1982). The United States Navy’s primary command leadership publication from 
1985 to 1996, Command Excellence: What It Takes to Be the Best, did not define
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leadership. However, the publication had strong implications for the “excellence theory”
of leadership. Current Navy views of exceptional leadership are based on a more
collaborative approach to leadership. The Navy’s Intermediate Officer Leadership Course
(Chief o f Naval Education and Training, 1996) defined leadership as “the process of
influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts toward goal achievement in
a given situation” (p. 1-2-3). On its revised performance evaluation form, a criterion for
attaining the highest mark in leadership is that an individual “constantly improves the
personal and professional lives of others” (p. 1). The Navy’s Command Leadership School
viewed leadership as a combination o f transactional and transformational leadership
theories, stating that they were the “two leadership concepts that are recognizable in any
organization, including the Navy ” (Chief o f Naval Education and Training, 1997, p. 2-2-
4). A 1978 study on predicted military leadership in the 1990s stated that future military
leaders would be more educated, with many possessing advanced degrees (Cox, 1978).
According to Cox, the greater an officer’s level of education, the more likely the officer
will identify himself/herself as liberal. Contrarily, Cox concluded that military leaders will
continue to qualify themselves as being conservative and that there is a strong positive
correlation between conservatism and combat experience.
Courage is a recurring theme in the writings of military leadership. The differences 
between military and nonmilitary views on the importance of courage in performing 
leadership are striking. Handle (1992) stated that the renowned 19th century military 
strategist, Jomini, prized courage as the most critical characteristic a military leader could 
have. Moran (1966), like Jomini, placed courage in high esteem, although he viewed 
courage as a consumable trait. He believed that courage is a limited supply of will power
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that can be used up in war and once one’s limited supply of courage is used up, it cannot
be replenished. The Navy has long acknowledged the importance of courage to leadership.
According to Tobin (1939),
There are two kinds o f courage, physical and moral courage. The former is by far
the more common of the two. Courage is an unnatural thing and exists only when a
person’s character is strong enough to overcome the fear instinct sufficiently to
prevent its taking charge (p. 26).
The Navy in its Intermediate Officer Leadership Course stressed that ‘In combat, a 
leader may have to take decisive action that will knowingly doom the lives of good men 
and women” (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 1996, p. 7-1-5). Covey (1989) 
believed that courage is the opposite of consideration. He declared that maturity is the 
balance between courage and consideration, appearing to give courage a negative 
meaning.
According to Frost, Fiedler, and Anderson (1983), taking physical risks is related 
to the performance of leaders engaged in professions with inherent physical dangers. Nye 
(1986) believed that freedom and courage are the two prime values o f a warrior.
According to Nye, freedom makes one fight and courage keeps one from running away. 
Stockdale (1995) agreed with Nye. He affirmed that a leader in crisis must be hardhearted 
and display the courage necessary to deal with fear, guilt, truth, and reality. In Griffith’s 
(1963) translation of Sun Tzu, he declared that the ancient Chinese strategist believed that 
if a general is not courageous, he will be unable to conquer doubts or to create great 
plans.
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Holmes (1985) stated that Army doctrine defined leadership as a process by which 
a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission. There was no mention of the 
relationship between courage and leadership in Army doctrine. According to Mack and 
Konetzni (1982), leadership training of naval officers M s into seven easily identifiable 
categories: personal characteristics; moral leadership; gentlemanly conduct; personal 
relations with seniors; personal relations with juniors; techniques of counseling and 
communication; and, the role of the officer in training. Mack and Konetzni placed 
courage, both physical and moral in an eighth category they referred to as Other 
Characteristics. The Navy in its Intermediate Officer Leadership Course acknowledged 
that “many studies point out that some of the personal characteristics desired in combat 
leaders do not serve them well in a peacetime military organization” (Chief of Naval 
Education and Training, 1996, p. 7-1-5). Cronin (1993) argued that there were seven key 
qualities of successful leadership. Courage is absent from Cronin’s seven essential 
qualities. Courage is also absent from Senge’s (1990) commercially successful book about 
learning organizations, The Fifth Discipline.
Practical Applications of Leadership Theory
According to Bass (1990), leadership models “show the interplay among the 
variables that are conceived to be involved; they are replicas or reconstructions of the 
realities” (p. 37). By the 1960s, the study of leadership evolved from research on the traits 
and situations that affect leadership to a view that leadership was contingent on a 
condition of traits and situations that involved a transaction or exchange between the 
leader and the led (Hollander, 1986). Bums (1978) presented the new paradigm of the 
transformation versus transactional leader where followers are converted into leaders.
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Waldman, Bass and Einstein’s (1986) analysis o f surveys of senior military officers and
business managers confirmed the fidelity o f transformational leadership. According to Bass
and Avolio (1988), transform ational leadership is closer to the prototypical leadership that
most people envision when they describe their ideal leader. In a study conducted for the
Navy, Yammarino and Bass (1989) contended that transformational leadership was more
strongly related to a subordinates and superior’s evaluation o f an officers’ effectiveness
than transactional leadership.
Heifetz (1998) disputed Bums’ theory of transformational leadership, arguing that
it is a leadership that fuels our tendencies to develop arrogant and grandiose visions,
fleeing “from harsh realities and dailyness o f leadership” (p. 26). He believed that
leadership is more than influence and more than that which can be defined in terms of
legitimate authority alone. Heifetz viewed leadership in terms o f adaptive work—work that
“consists o f the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to
diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face” (p. 22).
A hypothesized link between personality and leadership has surfaced in recent
years, due in part to organizational experiences attributed to leadership failures (Johnson,
1999). According to Johnson,
A review of leadership characteristics among military personnel in extreme
environments (aviation, submersibles, polar stations, and expeditions) found that
effective leaders in these environments were consistently ambitious, confident,
respected, and trusted by subordinates. These leaders were also sensitive to
personal problems among subordinates and openly expressed pride in the
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performance o f subordinates and offered recognition for accomplishments of their
subordinates (p. 907).
The review of the literature revealed that leadership had many different meanings 
and areas of applicatioa For example, the Department o f Defense’s Office o f Inspector 
General (1992) attributed the breakdown of behavior at the 1991 Tailhook Convention to 
failed leadership. According to the Office of Inspector General, “While each individual 
must be accountable for his or her own actions, commanding  officers have a unique 
responsibility for leadership in ensuring appropriate behavior and attitudes of those under 
their command” (p. 2). Leadership has also been linked to the varying pregnancy rates on 
Navy ships and the 1991 Tailhook Scandal.1 According to a study by the Center of Naval 
Analysis, “Large differences in pregnancy rates by ship may be indicative that leadership 
and training are key to minimizing pregnancy during sea tours” (Fletcher, McMahon & 
Quester, 1994, p. 27).
In summary, the review of leadership literature revealed that current leadership 
theory is robust, multi-dimensionaL, and situation dependent. It has undergone significant 
change throughout the 20th century, evolving in form from autocratic to collaborative to 
perhaps a more practitioner-based leadership theory as delineated by Heifetz.
1 The feet that women serving in ships get pregnant is often viewed as a leadership 
problem; the perception is, the better the leadership, the lower pregnancy rate.
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CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter addresses the methodology used to answer the three research 
questions covered by this study. Included in this chapter are the following sections: 
research questions and design, survey instrument development, survey reliability, non­
response bias, triangulation methodology, limitations, and the role of the researcher. The 
methodology used in this study was primarily quantitative, with most data gathered 
through the use of a survey consisting of a series of 5-point Likert-type scale items. In 
addition, comments solicited through open-ended questions were used to add explanatory 
power to the study, which inserted a qualitative richness to the methodology.
Research Questions and Design Overview
This study addressed three research questions. The research questions are as 
follows:
1. How, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice 
changed in the post-Vietnam history of the United States (1975-2000)?
2. How, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and 
practice varied by race, gender, or rank?
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam-era and 
post-Vietnam veteran’s perception of change in Navy leadership?
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To address the three research questions, the following 5-step approach was used (a 
more detailed description of each step is addressed later in this chapter):
1. Document Collection. After receiving permission from the Navy to conduct this 
study, documents were collected on Navy leadership training, performance evaluations, 
and leadership award criteria.
2. Pilot Interviews. Four pilot interviews (two officer and two senior enlisted) 
were conducted to assist in the development of the survey questionnaire.
3. The Survey. A survey was developed based on the results of step 2.
4. Survey Participants. The survey was distributed to officers and senior enlisted
personnel within one United States Navy carrier battle group2 with the goal of obtaining a 
minimum o f300 surveys from post-Vietnam veterans (those currently on active duty who 
had not served during the Vietnam era); it was distributed to enough Vietnam-era veterans 
(serving during Vietnam but not on active duty in 2000) to receive 150 returns.
5. Data Analysis. Data was computer analyzed using the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS).
Survey Instrum ent Development
This study involved three forms o f data gathering: document collection (described 
in Chapter One), pilot interviews, and a survey instrument. Data gathering began in 
December 1999 and ended in April 2000. Document collection was conducted between
2 A notional carrier battle group comprises an aircraft carrier and its air wing, two guided 
missile cruisers, two destroyers, one frigate, one replenishment ship, and two nuclear-powered 
attack submarines. The battle group comprises approximately 10,000 men and women o f which 
about 1,000 are officers and senior enlisted.
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December 1999 and February 2000 and pilot interviews were conducted in February 2000. 
Data from the pilot interviews were used to develop the primary research instrument used 
in this study. According to Warwick and Lininger (1975),
The sample survey is an appropriate means of gathering information under three 
conditions: when the goals o f the research call for quantitative data; when the 
information sought is reasonably specific and familiar to the participants; and, 
when the researcher has considerable prior knowledge o f particular problems and 
the range of responses likely to emerge (p. 9).
All three criteria were met for this study.
The researcher chose to use a survey as the instrument for participant response to 
the research questions because it was the best means to reach the greatest number of 
participants, ensure participant diversity vis-a-vis rank, race, and gender, and it allowed 
for a more objective analysis o f the responses.
Pilot Interviews.
Four pilot interviews were conducted using the questions outlined in Appendix B. 
The purpose of the pilot interviews was to provide the information necessary for 
developing a survey that would best address the study’s three research questions. Because 
the pilot interviews were key to the methodology used in this study, the results of the 
interviews are addressed in detail.
Two officers and two senior enlisted were interviewed over a 1-week time period. 
One officer was a cap tain/surface warfare officer and the other was a commander/aviator. 
Both senior enlisted were chief petty officers. All of the pilot interviewees validated the 
notion that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam, a deduction that the researcher
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made after reviewing official Navy documents. The end of Vietnam, Tailhook, and the
post-Cold War drawdown were cited as the three watershed events that affected Navy
leadership. To a much lesser extent, the advent of the technological age was cited as a
contributing factor to the changes in Navy leadership. Because the four pilot interviews
were so important to the development of the survey, they are discussed in substantial
detail in this chapter.
The surface warfare captain believed the Vietnam War shaped Navy leaders who
participated in the war and who also shaped future Navy leadership-future leaders who
served under officers that participated in the war. He stated that command during Vietnam
molded that generation o f leaders to communicate less with their people and be less
involved with them personally: He stated,
I think that wartime experience tended to create a mentality that we had to get the
job done and if I tell my people we gotta get the job done, that’s all they need to
know because we’re firing 5-inch shells in support of ground troops. You didn’t
have to explain to your people why that was important.
He believed leaders not of the Vietnam generation practiced a more relation-type 
leadership style that developed them as officers and individuals. He said,
.. .in the middle ‘80s, the commanding officer began to place a lot more emphasis 
on developing more personal relationships, sitting down in the wardroom [a 
meeting/dining room for officers onboard a ship], counseling junior officers, 
getting to know them on a more personal basis and guiding them and mentoring 
them. I think that kind of thing has developed in the last 10 or 12 years. Mentoring 
juniors officers was not on the captain’s agenda in the mid-‘70s.
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For the surface warfare captain, the end of the Coid War in 1991 was a watershed 
event for the Navy. It marked the end of a legitimate and continuous threat to United 
States naval forces at sea. He said, “Up until 1991,1 think every junior officer, certainly all 
department heads, the XOs and COs [Executive Officers and Commanding Officers] felt 
that we could very easily get into a shooting war with the Soviets ”
He further explained,
...the most powerful influence since '91 has been the drawdown and the 
requirement to bring down the size of the officer corps, which reduced the 
opportunity for department heads to screen for XO and that XO's screen for 
command. And that environment got very serious in '91, '92, and '93, and by '93 it 
was so grim that we were throwing out, I mean literally, throwing out excellent 
officers who 5 years beforehand would have been shoe-in for department head.
The surface warfare captain felt the leadership he encountered during his career 
transitioned from an autocratic style that was exercised by his Vietnam-era commanding 
officers to a more transformational leadership style that he saw in leaders who were not
influenced by Vietnam.3
The aviator commander also felt that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam. 
For him, the watershed event for Navy leadership and major impetus for the change in
3 Autocratic and transformational leadership styles are the researcher’s labeling of die 
leadership that the interviewee described. Both autocratic and transformational leadership theory 
are taught at die Navy’s Command Leadership School.
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Navy leadership was Tailhook. “...the Tailhook deal was the biggest change. And there
was an immediate effect. The repercussions o f all that, and all of a sudden the politics, you
know, the political correctness of everything. It was the biggest turnoff that my
community had." When speaking of Tailhook in general, he stated, “That [Tailhook] really
changed my whole view of the upper echelons of [Navy] leadership.”
During his discussion of the negative implications that the drawdown had on the
surface community, the commander was critical of how senior Navy leadership dealt with
Tailhook. He articulated,
They [senior Navy leaders] always give you no answer. To me that’s not a good
aspect. That was the worst aspect o f leadership during the whole period...It wasn’t
the Admiral’s fault that this [Tailhook] was happening. It’s because they were
being, [interviewee became emotional] you know, thumped by civilian leadership
to do something about it and that’s where we felt, well the leadership’s got no
backbone anyway. And so they’re just.. .just a bunch of quivering yes guys and
they’ll do whatever it takes to save themselves. And if it means cutting a few guys
off then that’s fine.
The aviator commander did not feel the drawdown had near the effect on Navy 
leadership that the surface captain did. He felt positive about the leaders he encountered 
during his career, 0-6s and below, and felt, for the most part, they exercised what the 
researcher interpreted as transformational leadership.
The chief petty officers also felt that Navy leadership had changed. Overall, they 
felt that Navy leadership was effective and and getting better.
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They believed Navy leadership today is, “...less forceful.” They stated that
leadership changed because sailors serving today are different than those who served
before. “It [Navy leadership] just changed because it had to.” One chief felt leaders needed
to lead by example and, “.. .hopefully your men will follow suit.” The other chief felt the
absence o f war was one factor contributing to changes in Navy leadership. “I thinlc that
not being at war changes things a lot as far as leadership is concerned. When you are at
war, it is a whole different ball game. But not having been in a major war since Vietnam,
I’m sure it’s [leadership] changed because o f that.”
They both agreed leadership was critical but not the answer to all the problems
confronting the Navy today. One chief stated,
I guess the challenge facing the Navy in as far as being a leader of men is making
sure you have quality men to lead. One thing I disagree with what the Navy has
said...'Well if you have a bad sailor, you can make him a good sailor. You’re just
not trying hard enough.11 disagree with that. You know I think some kids just
don’t want to be changed and they are bad apples no matter how hard you try.
One chief cited technology [computers] as a contributor to changes in Navy
leadership since Vietnam. However, he did not qualify the impact of technology on Navy
leadership.
Survey.
The pilot interviews discussed above were analyzed for indications o f change in 
Navy leadership theory and practice, and for commonality of themes. Using the data 
derived from the pilot interviews and document analysis, survey questions were 
developed. The survey was then pilot-tested by 10 volunteer members of a carrier battle
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group; the volunteers were equally distributed among officers and chief petty officers. The 
pilot survey included the following recommendations: delete a duplicate question, arrange 
the survey in a more user-friendly format, and reorder the survey questions. There were no 
recommendations for the addition or deletion of any questions.
The resultant survey (see Appendix C) consisted of three sections. The first nine 
questions requested demographic information, such as gender, highest military pay grade, 
designator, and race/ethnicity. The second section contained 26 items to assess attitudes 
about the components of Navy leadership, changes in Navy leadership, and current Navy 
leadership. Each item was rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 -  “Strongly 
disagree” to 5 -  “Strongly agree.” An option was included for “Don’t know/Not 
applicable.” The final section o f the survey consisted primarily of open-ended questions 
regarding events and years that marked significant changes in Navy leadership. Open- 
ended questions were used to allow the survey participants a means to articulate what 
years and events that they felt most represented change in Navy leadership.
Survey Reliability.
Survey reliability was obtained by two means. The first method was the process by 
which the survey was developed (document review and pilot interviews). The second 
method was the inclusion of several pairs of items that were the reverse of each other, i.e., 
“Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical courage” (item 
25)/”Physical courage is more important to leadership than moral courage” (item 29); 
‘Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than the drawdown (down 
sizing)” (item 26)/”The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes in Navy leadership 
than Tailhook” (item 30); “Current Navy leadership is too political” (item 27)/”Current
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Navy leadership is not political enough” (item 31); “The problem with Navy leadership
today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” (item 28)/ “The problem
with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough ‘warriors’ in senior positions”
(item 33). Response patterns for these pairs of items were checked to ensure that
participants read questions carefully throughout the survey. Of particular interest was the
percentage o f participants who agreed or strongly agreed with each statement within a
pair since this would signify agreement with two contradictory statements (participants
could disagree with both statements without contradicting themselves). For three of the
pairs, less than 2% of participants agreed or strongly agreed with both statements. For the
Tailhook/drawdown item pair, less than 3% of those surveyed agreed with both
statements. These percentages were considered acceptable indicators of survey reliability.
However, to ensure consistency o f responses, these surveys were eliminated from the
quantitative analysis .
Triangulation Methodology and Survey Participants
The survey was distributed to enough Navy officers and senior enlisted personnel 
to yield returns from 150 Vietnam-era veterans and 300 post-Vietnam veterans. A 
triangulation methodology was designed specifically to determine whether there is a 
perception that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam. For this analysis, the year 
1985 was set as the point of triangulation to determine if and how Navy leadership 
changed for the two participant groups, Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam veterans. Data 
from participants in each group who served on active duty in 1985 were compared to see 
if and/or how Navy leadership changed. For a Vietnam-era veteran to be in the 
triangulation group, he or she must have served both during Vietnam and in 1985 but not
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in 2000. Conversely, a post-Vietnam veteran must have served after 1975 and during
1985. Participants o f these two groups share in common the year 1985. However, the two
groups do not share  the same experiences of serving while the Vietnam War was in
progress. A comparison was made between 73 Vietnam-era veterans and 162 post-
Vietnam veterans who met the outlined triangulation criteria (see Figure 1).
Perceptions of change in Navy leadership since Vietnam were obtained by 
comparing how the two groups answered the following survey questions: (a)“Navy 
leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty”; (b)“The 
change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good o f the Navy5’; (c) “Navy 
leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership”; (d)“Navy leadership becoming more 
like civilian leadership is good for the Navy”; (e)“Navy leadership has changed since 
Vietnam, the change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy”; and 
(f)“I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.” I f  the two groups 
responded more like their larger group cohorts, Le., post-Vietnam era veterans and 
Vietnam-era veterans, than like each other, there would be quantitative evidence of 
perceived change in Navy leadership since Vietnam More simply stated, since both groups 
in the triangulation sample served in 1985, and each component is representitive of a
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Triangulation Methodology
Post-Vietnam Vets Vietnam-era Vets.
*Triangulation numbers
Figure 1 Triangulation Methodology
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larger group, then inferences could be made about changes in Navy leadership4
One carrier battle group was used to obtain the post-Vietnam surveys used in this 
study. The carrier battle group consisted of numerous ships, including an aircraft carrier 
and its air wing. The carrier battle group had a representative population of all Navy 
warfare areas, such as aviation, surface, submarine, and SEALs, both genders, and most 
races. Surveys were distributed with a return goal that mirrored the distribution of 
ranks/pay grades and gender within the battle group. In addition, an attempt was made to 
obtain proportional representation o f personnel by race/ethnicity, based on 31 March 2000 
Navy demographics. A 2-month survey window was targeted and maintained (see Table 
1).
The total number of senior leaders in the battle group was 1,034. It is not known 
how many surveys were distributed, however, it is estimated to be approximately 450. The 
383 surveys that were returned represent an approximate response rate of 85%. In total, 
37% of the entire senior leadership returned surveys.
4 The methodology used in this study to determine change in Navy leadership would have 
been stronger if a significant world and/or national event had taken place in 1985, the triangulation 
year that bridged both Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam era participants in the triangulation sample. 
If an event like this had occurred, agreement as to the significance of the event within the 
triangulation sample would have allowed for a stonger inference regarding intertemporal change in 
Navy leadership. Nonetheless, both groups in the triangulation sample did share the Reagan 
Administration's push for world military dominance and an arms build up not seen since the 
Vietnam War.
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Table 1
Gender. Rank, and Race/Ethnicity Breakdowns for Post-Vietnam Sample 
Variable Desired % (based on Navy Sample %




0-1 to 0-4 49 66
W-2 to W-4 3 3








Asian/Pac. Is. 5 7
Native Am. <1 <1
Other <1 2
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Table 1 shows gender, rank, and ethnicity breakdowns for the post-Vietnam participants.
The sample’s gender and race/ethnicity distributions were compared to overall Navy 
demographics and matched these percentages well. Sample percentages by rank were compared 
to the battle group demographics. The survey sample had a lower percentage of senior enlisted 
and a higher percentage of officers than found in the total battle group, perhaps an indication that 
the surveys were distributed to officers first. The researcher was unable to obtain reliable 
demographic data from the Vietnam War era. However, Vietnam-era participants in this study 
were overwhelmingly white/Caucasian, male, officer aviators.5
The post-Vietnam participants had served an average of 12.7 years on active duty. Most 
of the post-Vietnam participants reported their primary designator to be either surface warfare 
(47%) or aviation (36%). About 2% said their specialty was submarine warfare, 1% were SEALs, 
and 12% indicated their designator as “Other.” This category consisted of a number of specialties 
with the highest frequencies reported in the following areas: supply (25%), medical/dental (17%), 
and intelligence (15%). One-quarter of the post-Vietnam group had served in combat. About 87% 
reported receiving some type of formal leadership training while in the Navy.
Surveys from Vietnam-era veterans were obtained by mail. The majority of potential 
participants were selected randomly from the 1998 Membership Directory of the Tailhook 
Association. The two considerations for selection were naval service sometime during the period 
1965 and 1974, and rank/pay grade. A total o f450 surveys were mailed. Of this number, 62
5 Reliable demographic data for both the Vietnam era and a current Navy battle group were not 
available to the researcher. Consequently, comparisons using weighted data could not be made. However, 
comparisons for the post-Vietnam sample using data weighted for one battle group were placed in the 
appendices.
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surveys were returned undeliverable; 19 surveys were completed by someone who did not fit the
necessary criteria of time in service or rank; and, 11 were completed but not used because they
were returned after the deadline. The number of usable surveys was 178, which yielded a usable
response rate of 47%.
Within the Vietnam-era group, rank was distributed as follows: flag officer, 6%; 0-5/0-6, 
67%; 0-1 to 0-4,25%; W -l to W -4,1%; and E-7 to E -9,1%. Vietnam-era participants served 
an average of 19.5 years on active duty. Over 98% of these participants reported white/Caucasian 
as their ethnicity and over 95% were aviators. Aviators of the Vietnam era were all men and 
overwhelmingly white/Caucasian; therefore, race/ethnicity was not a variable of consideration for 
this group. Approximately 83% of these participants were Vietnam-era veterans and 78% served 
in combat.
Non-response Bias.
When all surveys that are distributed are not returned, there is a possibility of non­
response bias. This occurs when non-participants are systemically different from participants; this 
is a problem that can seriously limit the generalizability of survey findings (Edwards, Thomas, 
Rosenfeld, & Booth-Kewley, 1997). Non-response bias is difficult to detect after the fact and, 
therefore, is best dealt with proactively by ensuring an acceptable survey response rate. The 47% 
response rate for Vietnam-era veterans is in the acceptable range for a single-mailing (no follow 
up) survey with no incentives (Edwards et al.). The approximate response rate for the post- 
Vietnam group was 85%; which is considered a high rate of survey return. However, the rank 
distribution shown in Table 1 indicates that officers in the sample are over-represented and senior 
enlisted are under-represented. This may reflect non-response bias; it more probably reflects the 
pattern of survey distribution, with officers more likely than senior enlisted to receive surveys.
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The researcher contemplated weighting the data to reflect the battle group’s distribution
by rank. It was decided that, since many analyses involved comparisons with the Vietnam-era 
group and the data from this group could not be weighted, the post-Vietnam responses would not 
be weighted either. Caution must, therefore, be used when generalizing the results beyond the 
samples.
Data Analysis
The survey results were computer-analyzed using the SPSS. All appropriate 
research questions involved group comparisons of mean item scores using independent 
t-tests and one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Independent t-tests, which are 
used to compare two unrelated groups on a single variable, were run for all two-group 
comparisons (e.g., Vietnam-era versus post-Vietnam era). One-way ANOVAs allow 
comparisons of more than two groups on a single variable and were conducted 
whenever more than two groups were compared (e.g., comparisons among ranks).
For the purpose of statistical analysis, the scaled survey items were categorized into four 
groups. The scaled survey items in each of the four analysis groups correspond to the research 
questions. Statistical analysis group one, the nature of leadership, corresponds with research 
questions one and two: how, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice 
changed in the post-Vietnam history of the United States, and how, if at all, has the perception of 
change in Navy leadership theory and practice varied by race, gender, or rank? Statistical analysis 
group two, attitudes towards current Navy leadership, and three, changes in Navy leadership, also 
correspond with research questions one and two. Lastly, statistical analysis group four, events 
that led to changes in Navy leadership, corresponds with research question three: is there any
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evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam era veterans’
perception of change in Navy leadership? The four stastical analysis groups were as follows:
1. The nature of leadership comprised six items: (a) “Courage is a key component of Navy 
leadership”; (b) “Leadership is a gender-neutral term”; (c) “There is a difference between moral 
and physical courage”; (d)“Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership”; (e) “Moral 
courage is more important to leadership than physical courage”; and (f) “Physical courage is more 
important to leadership than moral courage.”
2. Attitudes towards current Navy leadership comprised four items: (a) “Current Navy 
leadership is too political”; (b) “Current Navy leadership is not political enough”; (c) “The 
problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions”; and 
(d) “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not enough ‘warriors’ in senior 
positions.”
3. Change in Navy leadership comprised six items: (a) “Navy leadership theory and 
practice changed during the time I served on active duty”; (b) “The change in Navy leadership 
theory and practice was for the good of the Navy”; (c) “Navy leadership is becoming more like 
civilian leadership”; (d) “Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the 
Navy”; (e) “The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy”; and (f) “I 
feel good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.”
4. Events that led to changes in Navy leadership comprised seven items: (a) “Navy 
leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty”; (b) “The change 
in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of the Navy”; (c) “Navy leadership is 
becoming more like civilian leadership”; (d) “Navy leadership becoming more like civilian 
leadership is good for the Navy”; (e) “Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam”; (f) “The
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change in change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for the good of the Navy”; and (g) “I feel
good about the direction Navy leadership is heading.”
The survey statements suggesting that change was good for the Navy were answered only
by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with the previous item. For example, unless a
participant agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “Navy leadership has changed since
Vietnam,” they would not respond to the next item, “The change in Navy leadership since
Vietnam is for the good of the Navy.”
For analysis purposes, all questions were equally weighted within each group. Six
independent /-tests were conducted for each item. The first three compared Vietnam-era
participants with the post-Vietnam group in the following configurations: total sample, aviators
only, and triangulation sample. The second group of /-tests compared groups within the post-
Vietnam sample by gender, race/ethnicity (white/non-white), and designator (surface warfare and
aviation).
In addition, within the post-Vietnam sample, an ANOVA was calculated for each item, 
using highest pay grade as the independent variable. Three groups were compared: senior enlisted 
personnel, 0-1 to 0-4, and 0-5/0-6. There were not enough warrant or flag officers in the 
sample to include them in the analyses. Because the F  test is an omnibus test (i.e., it indicates 
there is a significant difference among groups, but not where the difference lies), when a 
significant F-ratio was found, a post hoc Tukey-HSD test was conducted to determine specifically 
which groups in the overall analysis were significantly different from each other. The Tukey test is 
designed to allow comparisons of all pairs of means while maintaining the significance level set for 
the study. It uses the studentized range (Q) distributions. The Q distributions provide the
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minimum difference between the largest and smallest means in a set of means that is necessary to
reject the hypothesis that the means are equal (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 1998).
Ethical Considerations: The Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects
The established procedures of the University of San Diego’s Committee on Protection of 
Human Subjects were followed in undertaking the research study. Participation in the study was 
entirely voluntary. There were no expenses or risks to the participants. All participants were 
consenting adults and all participants signed a consent form (see Appendix D for interview 
research participants and Appendix E for survey research participants) prior to participating in the 
study. The consent form assured the participant that his or her information would remain 
confidential and that every effort would be made to report findings in a manner that would not 
identify the participant. Participant numbers and/or rank were used in quotes or descriptive 
materials. The content of all quotes or descriptions were reviewed and modified, as necessary, to 
ensure that the identities of participants were not inadvertently revealed. Interviewed participants 
were provided written transcripts of their interviews.
Entry. Access, and Document Collection.
The researcher obtained entry and access to current military personnel from higher 
authority, i.e., commanding officers of the individuals who were surveyed. Permission to 
interview officers came from their commanding officers (see Appendix F). For active duty 
personnel, surveys were distributed by an administrator who was chosen by the commanding 
officer to ensure that the researcher’s identity was not known to anyone but the commanding 
officer. This eliminated the possibility that the researcher’s rank and position in the Navy might 
unduly influence an individual who participated in the study. The researcher’s rank and position
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were not factors vis-a-vis civilian participants, i.e., rank and military position did not unduly
influence civilian participants.
Entry and access to non-active duty veterans was obtained directly from the individuals 
being surveyed and interviewed; in addition, various veterans groups, such as the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, Navy League, and the Tailhook Association, were used as a conduit to obtain 
access to a greater number of non-active duty veterans (see Appendix G).
Limitations
There were five major limitations of this study. The first limitation was that some active 
duty Navy personnel surveyed were indirectly in the researcher’s chain of command. The 
researcher compensated for this limitation by using the various layers of the chain-of-command to 
buffer himself from the individuals being surveyed, eliminating any perceived or real pressure to 
participate in the study. A second limitation was that some older Vietnam veterans have been 
removed from naval service for many years and had to rely on long-term memory to answer the 
survey and/or follow-on interview questions. Their recollection o f events and perceptions may be 
clouded by time and media events since they served on active duty; nonetheless, their views are 
extremely valuable for establishing a baseline for perceptions about Vietnam-era leadership. A 
third limitation was that veterans who left the Navy just after Vietnam may have different 
perceptions than Vietnam veterans who stayed on active duty to the study’s triangulation year of 
1985 and possibly beyond. A fourth limitation of this study was that distribution of surveys to 
post-Vietnam participants was not random; therefore, the post-Vietnam group does not represent 
a random sample of battle group personnel and caution should be used when generalizing to the 
entire battle group and to all Navy battle groups. In addition, battle group demographics are not 
representative of the Navy as a whole; therefore, generalizations to the entire Navy should not be
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made. Lastly, the vast majority of Vietnam-era aviator survey participants were, at one time,
members of the Tailhook Association and the issues covered by the survey may have been
particularly salient to this group.
Role of the Researcher
At the time of this study, the researcher was an active duty Navy Captain, naval aviator,
and carrier battle group chief of staff. He was very familiar with Navy leadership theory and
practice, had attended formal leadership training during his 20 years in the Navy, and approached
this study from the context of his professional experiences and educational background. He
recognized that his experiences helped to shape the questions and assumptions that underlie this
research but also believed that the quantitative methodology provided objectivity to the process.
The next chapter addresses the results of the survey.
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CHAPTER FOUR RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of this study. The study combined qualitative and 
quantitative methodology using a 5-point Likert-type scale survey that included a written 
comments section. Where appropriate, selected excerpts from the written comments have been 
added to the explanations of the quantitative data for the purpose of amplifying the data. The 
survey was designed to answer three research questions:
1. How, if at all, has the perception of Navy leadership theory and practice changed in the
post-Vietnam history of the United States (1975-2000)?6
2. How, if at all, has the perception of change in Navy leadership theory and practice 
varied by race, gender, or rank?7
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that Tailhook contributed to Vietnam-era and post- 
Vietnam veterans perception of change in Navy leadership?8
Frequency distributions of responses were calculated for all survey items for the Vietnam-
era
6 This research question was answered by survey items 1-5, 9-16, 20-23, 25, 27-29, 31-37, and 
the comments. See Appendix C.
7 This research question was answered by survey items 6-8, 17-18, 24, and the comments. See 
Appendix C.
8 This research question was answered by survey items 19, 26, 30, 36-38, and the comments. See 
Appendix C.
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sample and for the post-Vietnam sample (see Appendix H). As described in the previous chapter,
a series of /-tests and ANOVAs were computed for each survey item; three compared Vietnam-
era participants with the post-Vietnam group (total sample, aviators only, and triangulation
sample) and three assessed differences between subgroups within the post-Vietnam sample
(gender and race/ethnicity). In addition, within the post-Vietnam sample, an ANOVA was
calculated for each item, using highest pay grade as the independent variable, with post-hoc tests
computed when a significant F-ratio resulted.
Three cautions must be kept in mind when interpreting the data. First, the large number of 
/-tests and ANOVAs resulted in an increase in the probability of a Type I error. Therefore, a more 
stringent than usual significance level of .01 was adopted. Second, the Ns listed in tables are the 
total number of cases in each group, not necessarily the number of cases in each analysis. It was 
not unusual for a few participants to leave out an item. Therefore, the table Ns are approximate. If 
a particular analysis had a greatly reduced N, it was footnoted on the table where it appeared. 
Third, since there were only 22 women in the sample, generalizations should not be made from 
the gender comparisons described in this chapter.
The Nature of Leadership
Six items defined the nature of leadership category. Table 2 contains means and /-test 
results for the Vietnam-era/Post-Vietnam group comparisons. Table 3 shows Post-Vietnam means 
and /-test results for gender, race/ethnicity, and designator comparisons. Table 4 looks at the 
items by rank. Each item is discussed separately.
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Table 2
Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples




























Courage is a key component 
of Navy leadership
4.46 4.09 4.13** 4.45 4.15




Leadership is a gender-neutral 
term
4.09 4.33 -2.97 “ 4.10 4.34 -2.33 4.14 4.30 -1.28
There is a difference between 
moral and physical courage
4.20 4.23 -.34 4.19 4.38 -1.84 4,19 4.16 .25
Peacetime leadership is 
different than wartime 
leadership
3.34 3.71 -3.06 3.30 3,52 -1.43 3,19 3.71 -2.64”
Moral courage is more 
important to leadership than 
physical courage
3.91 3,68 2.46 3.90 3.71 1.55 3.92 3,63 2.05
Physical courage is more 
important to leadership than 
moral courage
2.04 2.23 -2,75 2.05 2,23 -1.95 1.92 2,25 -3,36
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Table 3
Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples




















Courage is a key component of 
Navy leadership
4.12 3.86 1.18 4.08 4.18 -.77 4.01 4.15 -1.24
Leadership is a gender-neutral 
term
4.34 4.50 -.91 4.33 4.33 .02 4,30 4.31 -.13
There is a difference between 
moral and physical courage
4.25 4.27 -.15 4.29 3.97 2,76** 4.14 4.37 -2.53
Peacetime leadership is 
different than wartime 
leadership
3.69 4.00 -1.48 3.74 3,59 .90 3.89 3.48 2,96**
Moral courage is more 
important to leadership than 
physical courage
3.68 3.82 -.63 3.73 3.46 2.03 3.69 3,70 -.07
Physical courage is more 
important to leadership than 
moral courage
2.22 2,19 .21 2,19 2.40 -2.17 2.25 2.24 .18
** p <  ,01
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Courage is a key component of Navy 
leadership
4.17 4.06 4.21 <1.00
Leadership is a gender-neutral term 4.33 4.33 4.33 <1.00
There is a difference between moral 
and physical courage
4.15 4.29 4.00 2.04
Peacetime leadership is different than 
wartime leadership
3.78 3.72 3.36 1.48
Moral courage is more important to 
leadership than physical courage
3.76 3.71 3.36 2.09
Physical courage is more important to 
leadership than moral courage
2.30 2.19 2.30 <1.00
**p < .01
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While all subgroups studied were fairly in agreement with the statement that
courage is a key component of Navy leadership, Vietnam-era participants were 
significantly more likely than their post-Vietnam counterparts to support this idea. No 
significant differences were found in the post-Vietnam sample comparisons.
Again, all groups agreed with the statement “Leadership is a gender-neutral term.” 
However, post-Vietnam participants in general (but not among aviators or within the 
triangulation sample) showed a significantly higher level of agreement with the statement 
“Leadership is a gender-neutral term” than Vietnam-era participants in general.
Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam participants agreed that there is a difference in 
moral and physical courage. Non-white post-Vietnam participants were significantly less in 
agreement with the item “There is a difference between moral and physical courage” than 
were white/Caucasian participants. In general there was less agreement with the notion 
that peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership than was seen with previous 
items. Post-Vietnam era participants in general showed significantly more agreement with 
the item “Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership” than Vietnam-era 
participants.
The difference between the two groups within the triangulation sample was 
particularly pronounced. Within the post-Vietnam samples, mean agreement for surface 
warfare officers was significantly higher than for aviation officers in their agreement that 
peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership.
There was mild agreement with the statement that moral courage is more 
important to leadership than physical courage and no significant differences between 
groups was found.
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Interestingly, significant differences were found for the item “Physical courage is
more important to leadership than moral courage.” Vietnam-era participants in general and
within the triangulation sample showed significantly more disagreement with the statement
“Physical courage is more important than moral courage” than did their comparison
groups. The strongest level of disagreement with the statement “Physical courage is more
important than moral courage” was reported by Vietnam-era participants in the
triangulation sample. Among post-Vietnam samples, white/Caucasian participants
disagreed more strongly that “Physical courage is more important than moral courage”
than did non-white participants.
In summary, group differences in defining the nature of leadership were most likely
to be found between Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam participants. Vietnam-era participants
were more likely to stress the importance of courage as a  component of Navy leadership,
particularly moral courage. They were less likely to see a difference between peacetime
and wartime leadership. For several items, the difference between the two generations of
participants was particularly pronounced within the triangulation sample, which indicated
a change in how the nature of leadership is defined.
Attitudes Towards Current Naw Leadership
Two sets o f items assessed attitudes towards current Navy leadership. Means and
t-tests for Vietnam-era/post-Vietnam comparisons are found in Table 5, while
comparisons within post-Vietnam groups are displayed in Tables 6 and 7.
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Table 5
Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Naw Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples






























3.23 4.42 4.28 1.51 4.46 4,06 3,28"
Current Navy leadership is not 
political enough
1.58 1.79 -2,99 1.57 1.70 -1.39 1,47 1,83 -3.43"
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are too many “warriors” in 
senior positions
1.54 2.00 -  _  . ♦* -6,24 1.52 1.78 -3,01** 1.39 2.20 -6.89"
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are not enough “warriors” in 
senior positions
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Table 6
Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership: Post-Vietnam Samples



















Current Navy leadership is too 
political
4.18 3,82 1.90 4.18 4.00 1.53 4.01 4,29 -2.78**
Current Navy leadership is not 
political enough
1,78 1.91 -.75 1,76 1,93 -1,53 1,84 1.67 1.83
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are too many “warriors” in 
senior positions
1.96 2.48 -2.72 1,96 2,21 -2.15 2,15 1,73 4.40**
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are not enough “warriors” in 
senior positions
3.51 2.84 2.72 3,51 3,28 1.62 3,36 3,68 -2.67**
** p < .01
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Table 7
Means and F-tests for Attitudes Towards Current N aw  Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam 
Samples hv Pav Grade/Rank
Item Pay grade/rank








Current Navy leadership is too 
political
4.06 4.22 3.85 3.25
Current Navy leadership is not 
political enough
2.05 1.70 1.67 6.74**
The problem with Navy leadership 
today is that there are too many 
“warriors” in senior positions
2.42 1.83 1.72 16.95**
The problem with Navy leadership 
today is that there are not enough 
“warriors” in senior positions
3.31 3.53 3.55 1.49
* * p <  .01
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General agreement was expressed that current Navy leadership is too political. The 
attitude that Navy leadership is too political was more strongly held by Vietnam-era 
participants in general and in the triangulation sample, as well as by aviation officers in the 
post-Vietnam group. Interestingly, the responses of aviators in the post-Vietnam group 
were more similar to their Vietnam-era counterparts than to their post-Vietnam cohorts.
A second item assessed the opposite attitude—that current Navy leadership is not 
political enough. Given the responses to the previously discussed item, it is not surprising 
there was general disagreement with the item ccNavy leadership is not political enough,” 
especially from Vietnam-era participants. Again, post-Vietnam aviators were similar in 
attitude to their Vietnam-era counterparts; however, their attitudes were not significantly 
different from their surface warfare cohorts. A significant difference in means was found 
on the basis of rank. A post-hoc test indicated that senior enlisted personnel disagreed less 
with the statement that Navy leadership was not political enough than did 0-1 to 0-4 and 
O-S/O-6 participants.
There was general disagreement with the item “The problem with Navy leadership 
today is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions.” Vietnam-era participants 
were stronger in their disagreement that “The problem with Navy leadership today is that 
there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than their post-Vietnam counterparts; 
the difference was especially notable within the triangulation sample.
Within the post-Vietnam sample, men demonstrated significantly greater 
disagreement with the item “The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too 
many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than did women. In addition, the mean response 
among aviation officers was significantly lower than for surface warfare officers. Officers
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showed more disagreement with the statement “The problem with Navy leadership today
is that there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than did senior enlisted.
Again, an item assessing the opposite attitude was included in the survey—that 
“The problem with Navy leadership involves not having enough ‘warriors’ in senior 
positions.” Vietnam-era participants in general more strongly agreed with this attitude 
than the post-Vietnam group as a whole. A difference was not found when aviators were 
compared. The largest difference was seen within the triangulation sample. Women were 
less likely to agree with the statement “The problem with Navy leadership is that there are 
too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions” than men, while aviation officers were stronger in 
their agreement than were surface warfare officers.
To summarize, participants generally agreed that “Current Navy leadership is too 
political” and generally disagreed that “The problem with Navy leadership today is that 
there are too many ‘warriors’ in senior positions.” Vietnam-era participants tended to be 
stronger in their attitudes that “Navy leadership is too political” than post-Vietnam 
participants. Again, this difference was, in several instances, particularly pronounced 
within the triangulation sample, which indicated that while active duty service of these 
participants overlapped in time, their attitudes towards current leadership did not overlap. 
Among post-Vietnam participants, officer responses concerning the Navy leadership being 
too political were more extreme than those of senior enlisted.
Has Navv Leadership Changed?
Four items assessed whether participants perceived that Navy leadership has 
changed. Three additional items measured whether such change was for the good of the 
Navy. Table 8 contains means and f-test results for the Vietnam-era/post-Vietnam group
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comparisons. Table 9 shows means and /-test results for the gender, race/ethnicity, and
designator comparisons, while Table 10 looks at rank. Again, each item is discussed
separately.
Participants tended to agree that Navy leadership theory and practice had changed 
during their time on active duty, with the highest level of agreement that Navy leadership 
had changed among those participants in the triangulation sample and the post-Vietnam 
senior enlisted personnel. For E-7 to E-9 participants, the mean for the item “Navy 
leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on active duty” was 
significantly higher than the mean for 0-1 to 0-4 officers. Those who agreed or strongly 
agreed that Navy leadership theory and practice had changed during their time on active 
duty responded to the following statement: “The change in Navy leadership theory and 
practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of the Navy.” It was 
clear that the Vietnam-era participants disagreed with the statement “The change in Navy 
leadership theory and practice during the time I served on active duty was for the good of 
the Navy.” Even though their post-Vietnam counterparts did not see the change as for the 
good of the Navy, active-duty participants were significantly more favorable in their 
assessment of changes than were Vietnam-era participants. Among the post-Vietnam 
groups, women showed significantly greater agreement with the statement “The change in 
Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I was one active duty was for the 
good of the Navy” than did men (although even among women there was not strong 
agreement with the statement). Interestingly, the percentage of women who had agreed 
with the original statement that Navy leadership theory and practice
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Table 8
Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples



























Navy leadership theory and 
practice changed during the 
time I served on active duty
3.81 3.87 -.51 3.82 3.84 -.12 4.25 4.16 .73
The change in Navy leadership 
theory and practice was for the 
good of the Navy®
2.35 3.13 -6,24** 2.35 2,99 -4.09** 2,27 3.21 -5,45**
Navy leadership is becoming 
more like civilian leadership
3.94 3.33 6.54** 3,93 3.38 4.62** 3,97 3.33 4,26**
Navy leadership becoming 
more like civilian leadership is 
good for the Navy®
1.63 2.51 -7.87** 1.62 2.21 -4,03 1,58 2,42 -4.86*’
Navy leadership has changed 
since Vietnam1*
4.41 4.23 2.58** 4.41 4.25 1.87 4.49 4,21 2.74**
The change in Navy leadership 1.95 3.39 -11,56** 1,93 3.22 -8.17** 1,99 3.45 -7,80**
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I feel good about the direction 
Navy leadership is heading
1.96 3.01 -11.13” 1.96 2.97 -8.25” 1.87 3.12 -8.68”
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item. 
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Table 9
Means and 7-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples
___________Item______________________Gender__________________ Race/ethnicity_________________Designator_______
Men Women /-value White Non- /-value Surface Aviation /-value 
(#=349 (#= 22) (# =  white warfare (#=139)
316) (#= 67) (#  =
________________________________________________________ 177)___________________
Navy leadership theory and 3.90 3.52 1.74 3,81 4.13 -2,58 3,97 3.80 1,55
practice changed during the 
time I served on active duty
The change in Navy leadership 3.09 3.75 -3.40** 3,06 3.43 -2,15 3,28 2.93 2.31
theory and practice was for the 
good of the Navy"
Navy leadership is becoming 3.36 3.19 .68 3,37 3,18 1.23 3.27 3.37 -.82
more like civilian leadership
Navy leadership becoming 2,47 2.90 -1,12 2,44 2.88 -1,91 2.69 2,15 3,05**
more like civilian leadership is 
good for the Navy"
Navy leadership has changed 4.25 4.19 .35 4.22 4,29 -.56 4,25 4.23 .22
since Vietnamb
The change in Navy leadership 3,38 3.35 .09 3.36 3,58 -.92 3.61 3.15 2,38
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Item Gender Race/ethnicity Designator
Men
(N= 349 ■ 
| 
i3












1 feel good about the direction 
Navy leadership is heading
2,99 3,32 -1,36 2,95 3,31 -2.51 3,08 2,92 1,25
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item,
b Except in the case of gender (with all but one woman responding to the item), between 27% and 37% of post-Vietnam samples 
answered this item “Don’t know/not applicable,”
**p < ,01
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Table 10
Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples bv Pav 
Grade/Rank
Item Pay grade/rank
E-7 to E-9 
(AT =86)






Navy leadership theory and practice 
changed during the time I served on active 
duty
4.28 3.68 3.94 13.28”
The change in Navy leadership theory and 
practice was for the good of the Navy3
3.22 3.09 3.10 <1.00
Navy leadership is becoming more like 
civilian leadership
3.47 3.29 3.24 <1.00
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian 
leadership is good for the Navy3
2.59 2.55 2.41 <1.00
Navy leadership has changed since 
Vietnam1*
4.23 4.28 4.15 <1.00
The change in Navy leadership since 
Vietnam is for the good of the Navy3
3.34 3.46 3.65 <1.00
I feel good about the direction Navy 
leadership is heading
3.18 2.95 3.00 1.33
a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.
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had changed was considerably smaller (59%) than the percentage o f agreement for any
other group (between 70% and 89%). So, women were less likely than men to view Navy
leadership as having changed, but those women who did see a change in leadership theory
and practice were more likely to view the change positively. Responses were mixed to the
item “Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership.” While post-Vietnam
groups were slightly on the positive side of neutral, their Vietnam-era counterparts were in
significantly greater agreement with the statement “Navy leadership is becoming more like
civilian leadership.” Close to three-quarters of the Vietnam-era participants and about one-
half of the Post-Vietnam participants then assessed the statement: “Navy leadership
becoming more like civilian leadership is for the good o f the Navy.” The means displayed
in Table 8 clearly demonstrate that Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership
is not viewed positively, especially by those serving during the Vietnam-era. In feet,
Vietnam-era veterans’ responses were significantly more negative than their post-Vietnam
counterparts.
Within the post-Vietnam groups, mean responses for the item assessing whether 
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership were on the positive side of 
neutral and there were no significant differences between groups. About half the 
participants within the post-Vietnam groups agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 
that Navy leadership was becoming more like civilian leadership and then went on to 
assess whether the change was good. Again, the assessment of this change tended to be 
negative. There was a trend for women and non-white participants to be less negative in 
their assessment that “Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is for the 
good of the Navy.” Aviation officers showed significantly greater disagreement with the
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statement that “Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is for the good of
the Navy” than did surface warfare officers.
There was agreement by all groups that Navy leadership has changed since 
Vietnam.9 (It should be noted that, depending on the analysis, between 27% and 36% of 
the post-Vietnam participants were unable to answer this question.)10 Vietnam-era 
participants, in general, and those in the triangulation sample were stronger in their 
agreement that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam than were their post-Vietnam 
counterparts. When those who agreed that Navy leadership had changed since Vietnam 
assessed whether this change was good, an interesting difference emerged. Vietnam-era 
participants were clear in their disagreement that changes in Navy leadership since 
Vietnam was for the good of the Navy. Post-Vietnam participants, however, were more 
favorable in their assessment that change in Navy leadership since Vietnam was for the 
good of the Navy, with means on the positive side of the middle of the scale. This item 
generated a very large difference in response and all group differences between Vietnam- 
era and post-Vietnam group means were significant. No differences between the Post- 
Vietnam groups were significant, although there was a trend for aviation officers to see 
changes in Navy leadership since Vietnam in a less positive light than did surface warfare 
officers.
9 This item should not be confused with the item “Navy leadership theory and practice 
changed during die time I was on active duty.”
10 The researcher believed that the inability of participants to answer this survey item is 
attributed to the limited service time of some of die younger officers.
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The final item in this group was “I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is 
heading.” This item again exposed large, statistically significant differences between the 
Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam participants. The mean responses for Vietnam-era 
participants showed clear disagreement with the item ‘1 feel good about the direction 
Navy leadership is heading,” while Post-Vietnam responses hovered around the middle of 
the scale. Among post-Vietnam groups, no significant differences were found; however, 
there was a trend with whites expressing a more favorable attitude to the direction Navy 
leadership is taking than did non-whites.
In summary, participants (especially Vietnam-era) tended to see Navy leadership as 
having changed and, generally, this change was not viewed positively. Vietnam-era 
participants were particularly negative in their assessment of change and the direction in 
which Navy leadership is heading. As discussed with previous items, the participants on 
active duty within the triangulation sample were more similar in attitude to post-Vietnam 
participants in general than to the Vietnam-era participants in the triangulation sample. 
Again, this indicates that there has been a shift over time in perceptions about how Navy 
leadership has changed.
Events Contributing to Changes in Naw Leadership
The final set of scaled items, displayed in Tables 11, 12, and 13, assessed the 
impact of three “events” on Navy leadership: technology, Tailhook, and the Post Cold 
War drawdown (downsizing). In addition, an open-ended item asked participants to list 
the world, national, or social events they thought most contributed to changes in Navy 
leadership. A second item listed several years and asked which was most pivotal to 
changes in post-Vietnam Navy leadership.
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Table 11
Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-era and Post-Vietnam Samples
___________ Item____________________Total sample________________ Aviators only_____________ Triangulation sample
Vietnam Post- /-value Vietnam Post- /-value Vietnam Post- /-value 
-era Vietnam -era Vietnam -era Vietnam
(W= (N= (N= (.N= (N= 73) (N
178)_____383)______________ 170)_____ 146)______________________ =162)__________
Technology
Technology has contributed to 3.57 3,98 -5.43** 3.55 3,87 -3.52** 3.56 3,98 -3,72**
changes in Navy leadership
The changes that technology 3,31 3,68 -3,67** 3,31 3,77 -3,97** 3.35 3,73 -2,39
has contributed to Navy 
leadership are for the good of 
the Navy"
Tailhook
Tailhook greatly affected 4,18 4,00 1,95 4,19 4,26 -.61 4,29 3,94 2.55
Navy leadership
Navy leadership significantly 4.16 3,90 2,98** 4,18 4.09 .95 4,23 3,86 2,73**
changed since the 1991 
Tailhook scandal
My faith in senior Navy 4,37 3,35 12,21** 4,40 3.66 6,53" 4.40 3,22 9,34*
leadership decreased because 
of how Tailhook was handled
Drawdown
Navy leadership significantly 3,56 3,78 -2.41 3,55 3,73 -1,55 3,57 3.72 -1,10




















Changes in Leadership Theory
Item Total sample Aviators only Triangulation sample
My faith in senior Navy 
leadership decreased because 
of how the drawdown was 
handled 
Tailhook versus drawdown
3.78 3.26 5.78*' 3.78 3,56 3.69” 3,84 3,17 5,18”
Tailhook was more a catalyst 
for changes in Navy leadership 
than the drawdown
3,66 3,25 4.00” 3,70 3.51 1.53 3,52 3.21 1.99
The drawdown was more a 
catalyst for changes in Navy 
leadership than Tailhook
2.52 2.84 -3.41” 2.50 2.62 -1.11 2.53 2,86 -2.39
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item, 
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Table 12
Means and 7-tests for Events Contributin(z to Change in Leadership Items: Post-Vietnam Samples
___________ Item______________________Gender_________________ Race/ethnicity_________________Designator_________
Men Women /-value White Non- /-value Surface Aviation /-value 
(N=  349 (N =  22) (N=  white warfare ( N = 139)
316) (N = 67) (N=
_______________________________________________________ 177}____________________
Technology
Technology has contributed to 3,98 4.09 -,67 3,96 4,11 -1,50 4,09 3,84 3,10*
changes in Navy leadership
The changes that technology has 3.67 3,74 -.30 3,62 3,94 -2,51 3,66 3,74 -.73
contributed to Navy leadership 
are for the good of the Navy*
Tailhook
Tailhook greatly affected Navy 3,98 4.29 -1.28 3,99 4,06 -.52 3,75 4,26 -4,25*
leadership
Navy leadership significantly 3.89 4,18 -1,43 3,91 3,89 ,13 3,73 4,09 -3,26
changed since the 1991 Tailhook 
scandal
My faith in senior Navy 3.37 2,95 2,16 3,41 3,05 2,62** 3,08 3.70 -5,05
leadership decreased because of 
how Tailhook was handled
Drawdown
Navy leadership significantly 3,77 3,82 -,22 3,75 3,88 -.96 3,80 3,71 .82
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My faith in senior Navy 
leadership decreased because of 
how the drawdown was handled
3,28 3.05 1.32 3,27 3.19 .63 3.18 3.39 -1.83
Tailhook versus drawdown
Tailhook was more a catalyst for 
changes in Navy leadership than 
the drawdown
3.24 3,35 -.46 3.25 3.23 ,14 3.03 3,51 -3.91
The drawdown was more a 
catalyst for changes in Navy 
leadership than Tailhook
2.85 2.80 .21 2.80 2,98 -1,59 3.08 2.59 4,47
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item,
**p< ,01
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Table 13
Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items- Post-Vietnam 
Samples hy Pay Grade/Rank
Item Pay grade/rank
E-7 to E-9 
(N= 86)







Technology has contributed to changes in 
Navy leadership
3.93 4.00 4.09 <1.00
The changes that technology has 
contributed to Navy leadership are for the 
good of the Navy*
3.79 3.67 3.50 1.18
Tailhook
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership 3.90 4.06 3.94 <1.00
Navy leadership significantly changed since 
the 1991 Tailhook scandal
3.84 3.95 3.94 <1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership 
decreased because of how Tailhook was 
handled
3.00 3.47 3.61 7.24**
Drawdown
Navy leadership significantly changed due 
to the Post-Cold War drawdown
3.73 3.81 3.73 <1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership 
decreased because of how the drawdown 
was handled
3.21 3.29 3.27 <1.00
Tailhook versus drawdown
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in
Navy leadership than the drawdown
3.38 3.19 3.39 1.25
The drawdown was more a catalyst for 
changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook
2.98 2.85 2.42 4.10
a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.
** p <  .01
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Technology
Two survey items considered the effect o f technology. In response to the following 
statement: “Technology (the information age) has contributed to changes in Navy 
leadership,” group means fell on the “agree” side of the 5-point Likert-type scale. 
Vietnam-era participants were significantly less in agreement that technology has 
contributed to changes in Navy leadership than their Post-Vietnam counterparts. For 
example, post-Vietnam-era participant 342 said, "Technology has increased senior 
leadership’s ability to micromanage.” Another post-Vietnam era veteran participant 118 
added, “Technology is good, but it’s being crammed down our throats at a rate that we 
can’t absorb." Not all post-Vietnam comments were negative however, as seen in 
participant I54’s statement: “Information technology has made life easier and efficient.
Among the post-Vietnam groups, the mean level of agreement of surface warfare 
officers that technology has contributed to changes in Navy leadership was significantly 
higher than that o f aviation officers.
Participants who agreed or strongly agreed that technology had contributed to 
changes in Navy leadership were then asked whether these changes were for the good of 
the Navy. While still on the positive side, the group means indicated that participants were 
somewhat unsure about whether technology’s impact on Navy leadership had been 
positive. Vietnam-era participants in general, and aviators in particular, were significantly 
less positive in their assessment that technology contributed to changes in Navy leadership 
than their post-Vietnam counterparts. Interestingly, among post-Vietnam groups, non- 
white participants were more favorable in their ratings of the impact of technology than 
white participants.
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Tailhook
In response to the four survey items addressing Tailhook, there was general 
agreement within almost all groups that Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership. Post- 
Vietnam aviators were significantly stronger in their agreement that Tailhook greatly 
affected Navy leadership than were surface warfare officers. There was a trend within the 
triangulation sample for less agreement with the statement that Tailhook greatly affected 
Navy leadership among Post-Vietnam participants than Vietnam-era participants. A similar 
question (“Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal”) 
yielded somewhat different responses. In this case, Vietnam-era participants in general, 
and within the triangulation sample, agreed more strongly with the statement “Navy 
leadership significantly changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal” than did post-Vietnam 
participants in the same triangulation sample. As in the previously discussed item, post- 
Vietnam aviation officers agreed more strongly that “Navy leadership significantly 
changed since the 1991 Tailhook scandal” than did surface warfare officers.
The final Tailhook item assessed whether faith in senior Navy leadership had 
declined because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders. A clear difference 
was evident between all groups of Vietnam-era participants (who, for the most part, 
agreed with this hem) and their Post-Vietnam counterparts (who were closer to the middle 
of the scale). Among post-Vietnam groups, women showed the most disagreement that 
their faith in senior Navy leadership had declined because of how Tailhook was handled, 
although their mean was not significantly different from that of the men. Non-white 
participants showed less agreement with the statement that their faith in senior Navy 
leadership had declined because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders than
75
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white participants, and surface warfare officers showed less agreement with that statement 
than did aviation officers. Officers showed more agreement with this item “My faith in 
senior Navy leadership decreased because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy 
leaders” the than senior enlisted participants.
Over 40% of Vietnam-era participants who responded in the comments section 
wrote about Tailhook. The lack of leadership on the part o f senior officers was often 
mentioned. Vietnam-era participant 212 said, “No senior leadership agreed with it but 
none had the courage to stand and put career on the line. I am ashamed of these so-called 
leaders.” In addition, participant 108 declared, “Tailhook was mishandled by Navy 
leadership. They should have hammered the relatively small number of guilty and moved
__ >9on.
Drawdown.
There was some agreement that Navy leadership changed due to the post-Cold 
War drawdown, although group means hovered on the positive side of the middle of the 
scale. No significant differences between groups were found for the item “Navy leadership 
significantly changed due to the post-Cold War drawdown.” While agreement again was 
lukewarm for the item assessing a decrease in faith in Navy leaders due to their handling of 
the drawdown, the means o f Vietnam-era participants were significantly higher than their 
post-Vietnam counterparts. A typical comment on the on the negative effect that the post- 
Cold War drawdown had on Navy leadership can been seen in the following remark. 
Vietnam-era veteran participant 234 said, “Senior leadership failed to recognize how 
horribly damaging it was to throw out good, dedicated people, or live under the threat of 
involuntary termination.”
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Taflhnnlc Versus Drawdown.
There was mild agreement to the notion that Tailhook was more of a catalyst for 
Navy leadership change than was the drawdown. Agreement was stronger among 
Vietnam-era participants in general when compared to the entire Post-Vietnam group. 
Post-Vietnam aviators were more like Vietnam-era participants than their cohorts; their 
agreement with the notion that Tailhook was more o f a catalyst for Navy leadership 
change than the post-Cold War drawdown was significantly higher than surface warfare 
officers. The reverse of this item was also included. In general, there was mild 
disagreement that the post-Cold War drawdown was more a catalyst of change in Navy 
leadership than was Tailhook. Vietnam-era participants disagreed more strongly than post- 
Vietnam participants, and aviation officers in the Post-Vietnam group had significantly 
lower means that surface warfare officers that the post-Cold War drawdown was more of 
a catalyst of change in Navy leadership than was Tailhook.
Significant Events and Years.
In an open-ended question, participants were asked: “If you believe that Navy 
leadership has changed, what world, national, or social event/events most contributed to 
the change?” Up to four responses were content coded for each participant, and the 
results tallied. Participants were also presented with six choices of years: 1975, 1979,
1985, 1991, 1994, and “other,” and asked which was most pivotal to changes in post- 
Vietnam Navy leadership.
The top event was Tailhook; mentioned by 35% of Vietnam-era participants and 
34% of post-Vietnam participants who responded to this particular open-ended question. 
Not surprisingly, 1991 was the year chosen most often by both post-Vietnam (52%) and
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Vietnam-era (39%) participants as the year most pivotal to changes in Navy leadership
since Vietnam. Among post-Vietnam participants, the other important events were: the
end o f the Cold War (31%), the drawdown (25%), and information technology (8%).
To summarize this section, Tailhook was viewed as a major event associated with 
changes in Navy leadership. Vietnam-era participants and post-Vietnam aviators were 
strongest in this belief. Again, patterns of significance within the triangulation sample 
mirrored, in general, the patterns found for the Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam groups in 
general, supporting the notion that Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam. The next 
chapter is a discussion of the results, including recommendations and areas for future 
research.
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CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY
Chapter Five provides a summary o f this research, which includes the purpose, the 
methodology, and findings. The chapter concludes with recommendations for the United 
States Navy and areas for future research.
Purpose
The purpose of the study was threefold: (a) to assess the perception of change in 
Navy leadership in the past quarter of a century since Vietnam; (b) to establish if the 
perception of change in Navy leadership varied by race, gender, or rank; and (c) to 
determine if any significant social or world event contributed to changes in Navy 
leadership since Vietnam.
Methodology
A 38-item, 5-point Likert-type scale survey, which included open-ended questions 
to add explanatory power, was designed to answer three research questions. The study 
methodology was predominately quantitative with a total o f 561 surveys returned. Two 
distinct groups of Navy veterans served as survey participants: Vietnam-era veterans and 
post-Vietnam veterans. Vietnam-era veterans included officers and senior enlisted who 
served in the Navy at any time during the Vietnam War but were not on active duty in the 
year 2000. Post-Vietnam veterans were defined as officers and senior enlisted who served 
in the Navy after 1975, the end of the Vietnam War. The survey response rate for 
Vietnam-era veterans was 47% and for post-Vietnam veterans it was 85%.
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A triangulation methodology was specifically designed and used to determine
whether there is a perception that Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam. For this 
analysis, the year 1985 was set as the point of triangulation to determine if and how Navy 
leadership changed for the two participant groups, i.e., Vietnam-era and post-Vietnam 
veterans. Data from participants in each group who served on active duty in 1985 were 
compared to see if and/or how Navy leadership changed. For a Vietnam-era veteran to be 
in the triangulation group, he or she must have served both during Vietnam and in 1985 
but not in 2000. Conversely, a post-Vietnam veteran must have served after 1975 and 
during 1985. Participants of these two groups share in common the year 1985. However, 
the two groups do not share the same experiences of serving while the Vietnam War was 
in progress. A total of 73 Vietnam-era veterans and 162 post-Vietnam veterans met the 
triangulation criteria and were compared.
Perceptions of change in Navy leadership since Vietnam were obtained by 
comparing how the two groups in the triangulation sample answered the following survey 
questions: (a)“Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the time I served on 
active duty”; (b)“The change in Navy leadership theory and practice was for the good of 
the Navy”; (c) “Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian leadership”; (d)“Navy 
leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for the Navy”; (e)“Navy 
leadership has changed since Vietnam, the change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is for 
the good of the Navy”; and (f)“I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is 
heading.” If the two groups responded more like their larger group cohorts than like each 
other, there would be support for the notion that perceptions of Navy leadership have 
changed.
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Summary o f Findings
The first of the researcher's three research questions asked if the perception of 
Navy leadership theory and practice changed since the end of the Vietnam War. The 
answer was unequivocally yes. All three groups studied, Vietnam-era veterans, post- 
Vietnam veterans, and the triangulation group (Vietnam-era veterans who served between 
1965 and 1974 and also in 1985 but had left the Navy prior to 2000, and post-Vietnam 
veterans who served between 1976 and 2000, including 1985) were in agreement that 
Navy leadership had changed. The most agreement resided in the triangulation group, 
which was the group that was specifically designed to measure change in Navy leadership. 
The triangulation year (1985), was the common year that both of these groups overlapped. 
It represented the heart of the Reagan military buildup, the quest for a 600-ship navy, 
stealth bombers and fighters, and the Strategic Defense Initiative.
The second research question asked how, if at all, has the perception of change in 
Navy leadership theory and practice varied by gender, race, or rank. The answer to this 
question was more nuanced than the first. There were a number o f differences in how 
women, non-whites, and senior enlisted answered some of the survey questions. For 
example, officers felt more strongly than senior enlisted that Navy leadership was too 
political. O f the participants who agreed that Navy leadership has changed, officers were 
also stronger in their attitude that Tailhook contributed to their decline in faith in Navy 
leadership. Women felt more strongly than men that changes in Navy leadership have been 
for the good of the Navy. Although the women were more likely than any other group to 
view Navy leadership as not having changed at all, those who did believe that the Navy 
had changed thought the changes were for the good o f the Navy. Further, women
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disagreed more than men with the statement that there are not enough ‘warriors' in
leadership positions. Women showed the most disagreement to the statement that their
faith in Navy leadership declined because of how Tailhook was handled by senior Navy
leadership. Whites felt more positively about the direction Navy leadership was taking
than non-whites. Non-whites were more favorable in their rating technology as an agent of
change for Navy leadership. Perhaps the most positive finding of this study had nothing to
do with differences between gender, race, or rank. All groups felt that leadership was
gender neutral. Even Vietnam-era veterans affirmed the gender neutrality of leadership,
even though many indicated that women do not belong in combat units.
The third research question asked if there was any evidence to suggest that 
Tailhook contributed to the perception of change in Navy leadership. As with the first 
research question, the answer was yes. In feet, the single world, national, or social event 
that survey participants chose most frequently as contributing to change in Navy 
leadership was the 1991 Tailhook Scandal. Thirty-five percent of post-Vietnam 
participants and 34% of Vietnam-era participants listed Tailhook as an event that 
contributed to changes in Navy leadership. As well, when asked to choose what year 
represented the year most pivotal to change in Navy leadership, 52% of post-Vietnam 
veterans and 39% Vietnam-era veterans chose 1991. It was very telling that one single 
social event—Tailhook—so greatly contributed to the perception of change in Navy 
leadership. It was not the only event that participants felt contributed to change in Navy 
leadership, but, it was the most frequently chosen event and one that aviators felt very 
strongly about. This finding is important because the majority of unrestricted line officers, 
the Navy’s warfighters, believe that Tailhook had a negative impact on Navy leadership.
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Based on the findings, it is evident that the 1990s were not kind to Navy
leadership. During the early ‘90s, the Navy was forced to reconcile with the effects of
Tailhook, the end of the Cold War, and the massive personnel and material drawdown that
followed. The devastation done by Tailhook was immediate and shocking, whereas the
drawdown, which was less public, had a lingering negative effect on the Navy. However,
the fallout from both Tailhook and the drawdown still affect Navy leadership today. To a
much lesser extent, the use o f technology impacted veterans’ perception o f changes in
Navy leadership. Tailhook, the drawdown, and the information age are addressed below.
Tailhook
There are many events that have challenged Navy leadership since Vietnam. 
However, none had the influence of Tailhook. The mishandling of Tailhook by senior 
Navy leadership had a grave and negative impact on the Navy and damaged how officers, 
aviators in particular, view Navy leadership today. Faith in senior leadership at the flag 
level was destroyed. A typical response can be seen in the following survey comment by 
survey participant 39,
Tailhook was mishandled by Navy leadership. They should have hammered the 
relatively small number o f guilty and moved on. They, however, let it simmer for 
years. I retired in 1992 after Tailhook and Clinton’s election. I am an USNA ‘73 
[Naval Academy class o f 1973] grad and saw the leadership in the Navy abandon 
its officers because of the political atmosphere. Many of my classmates followed 
suit [retired] after 20 years of service.
Tailhook was a product o f failed leadership just as the Department o f Defense’s 
Office of Inspector General (IG) (1992) asserted when it attributed the breakdown of
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behavior at the 1991 Tailhook Convention to leadership. The IG stated that commanding
officers did not ensure appropriate behavior and attitudes of those under their command.
As the Tailhook generation retires and/or resigns from the naval service, the 
residual effect of Tailhook will lesson and its impact on Navy leadership will diminish 
However, the lessons of Tailhook should never be forgotten. The Navy needs to reflect on 
Tailhook lessons learned prior to the next crisis. Just as the IG found fault in the 
commanding officers for the behavior o f their subordinates during the 1991 Tailhook 
scandal, a future Tailhook would still hold commanding officers accountable and 
responsible for every member in their command. According to United States Navy 
Regulations (1990), the responsibility of the commanding officer for his or her command 
is absolute. This philosophy is contrary to some contemporary views on leadership. For 
example, Heifitz and Laurie (1997) believed that leadership is the responsibility of every 
individual at every level and should no longer be thought of as “the responsibility of the 
few, a rare event, or a once in a lifetime opportunity” (p. 134). However, Heifitz and 
Laurie’s assessment of how leaders get removed from organizations certainly applies to 
Tailhook. They asserted that leaders are not removed from organizational life because they 
take risks. They are removed because they fail to see that an action or course of action will 
get them fired. The commanding officers whose careers were terminated because of 
Tailhook had no clue that they were in danger. Perhaps one of the key lessons learned 
from Tailhook is for Navy officers to remember that they are held to a higher standard of 
conduct than the average American. Prior to Tailhook, Bennis and Nanus (1985) 
heightened the importance of morality as a component of leadership. Since Tailhook, the 
Navy has emphasized ethics and morality in its leadership training.
84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
End o f the Cold War/Drawdown.
Many Navy officers perceived that the post-Cold War drawdown of personnel, 
ships, and squadrons contributed to changes in Navy leadership. The effect of the 
drawdown was significant for post-Vietnam veterans and for surface warfare officers, 
more so than it was for aviators. The clearest perspective of the impact of the post-Cold 
War drawdown can be seen in the comments of participant 257:
My great complaint against our leadership over the past decade is lack of vision, 
plus lack o f insight as to how to make a vision into reality. Our utter failure to 
manage the drawdown bears testimony--15 years and not a single new aircraft 
design has reached the fleet. The only new submarine design proved utterly 
unaffordable. Our surface fleet is aging and ill maintained. I’m not saying I could 
do better, but I would like to see better from those we entrust with stars 
[Admirals].
Almost one-third (31%) of post-Vietnam veterans cited the end of the Cold War 
and 25% cited the drawdown as an important contributor to changes in Navy leadership. 
The most radical comments were provided by post-Vietnam veteran participant 302 who 
believed the following11:
The cold war ended and the country wanted to spend less on the military. 
Downsizing occurred. This caused the competition among officers and CPOs to 
increase dramatically. The competitiveness generated a bunch of ass kissing, so
11 The comment represented the contempt many post-Vietnam veteran participants had for 
the type of leader the post-Cold War drawdown created
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that the senior personnel could be assured advancement in rate/rank. These weak
leaders and this trend started 8 years ago and now these guys are the Master
Chiefs and 0-5 s who are not Navy leaders but in the CO/CMC [command master
chief] position! This combined with the implement o f TQL—and the kinder/gentler
bullshit is killing my Navy.
Information Technology.
Information technology was cited by 8% of post-Vietnam veterans as an important 
world, national, or social event that contributed to changes in Navy leadership. The recent 
developments of the information age and the speed and means by which information 
travels, present a challenge to traditional Navy leadership practices. The most provocative 
perspective can be seen in the comment by participant 327 who stated,
Technology has increased senior leadership’s ability to micromanage. Rather than 
decreasing demands on junior personnel and freeing more time for hands-on 
leadership, junior personnel spend more time responding to minutia from senior 
leadership.. .1 believe technology has degraded leadership. Management by e-mail 
will kill us ail.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are offered for the United States Navy:
1. Build on the finding that the majority of Navy officers and senior enlisted feel 
that leadership is gender-neutral. This is a very positive finding and should be made known 
to leadership and throughout the ranks. It is an indication that Navy culture is changing 
and that leadership training is reaching many in the fleet and those in key positions.
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2. Make use of the fact that this leadership survey revealed that at least one current 
carrier battle group felt neutral about the direction in which Navy leadership is heading. 
This too is very positive. Neutral is good, especially vis-a-vis leadership and the past 
decade. It is doubtful that the same results would have been achieved if this survey were 
administered 4 or 5 years ago.
3. Try to determine why current Navy officers and senior enlisted place physical 
courage in higher esteem than moral courage, contrary to Vietnam-era Navy personnel.
4. Read the Survey Comments (see Appendix J). Although they were not germane 
to answering this study’s three research questions and not included in the main body of the 
study, they provide insight into the feelings and perceptions of the 561 Vietnam and active 
duty veteran survey participants.
The results of this study will be made available to senior Navy leaders, officers, 
and enlisted. It will also be briefed to the Navy’s leadership school and other organizations 
and individuals who are responsible for leadership training and implementing change in 
Navy leadership theory and practice.
Areas for Future Research
Many areas were highlighted as a result of this study that still need further 
research. A more comprehensive study on the differences of race and gender vis-a-vis 
Navy leadership also needs to be addressed. This study only scratched the surface of race, 
gender, and leadership. The survey used in this study should be administered to Vietnam- 
era surface warfare officers, comparing the results to those of the aviator participants of 
this study. This will establish if there are any significant differences between those two 
groups.
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APPENDIX B PILOT INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
I would like to thank you for your time. Your insight will be key to helping me determine
how, if at all, did Navy leadership changed since Vietnam.
1. Can you tell me a little bit about Navy leadership during the time you served?
2. How would you categorize and access Navy leadership during your time on active 
duty?
3. Did you notice any changes in leadership theory or practice during the years you 
served?
4. (If participant did notice a change) What do you think may have caused or contributed 
to that change?
5. What is your assessment of that change on the Navy?
Did you attend any formal leadership training while you were in the Navy?
6. Is there anything that you would like to add?
Once again, thank you very much for giving up your valuable time.
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APPENDIX C LEADERSHIP SURVEY
You are being asked to complete this brief survey as part of an effort to assess the 
changes in Navy leadership theory and practice, post-Vietnam. The results of this sunn 
will be used as part of a doctoral dissertation in leadership studies for an active duty 
naval officer, and will be shared with the U.S. Navy. Your participation in this survey is 
strictly voluntary and your anonymity is assured. Please return this survey to the 
administrator who handed it out to you or if provided, place it in the addressed stamped 
envelope and return it for processing.
PART I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION: Please select the appropriate response.
1. Are you:____ Active duty Navy _____ Retired Navy  Former Navy (not retired)
2. I served in the Navy on active duty from 19______to____ .
3. Are you:____ A combat veteran  Not a combat veteran
4. Are you a Vietnam Veteran? Yes _____ No
5. Are you:_____Surface Warfare  Aviation  Submarine Warfare
. a SEAL  Other (please specify)_____________________________
6. Please select your highest military paygrade:
 E7-E9 _____ W1-W4  01-04  05-06  Flag
7. What is your s e x ? _Male  Female
8. The following question is based on current DOD race/ethnic categories, if you are of 
multiple heritages, please choose the race/ethnic group with which you MOST closely 
identify or select on official Navy correspondence. Are you:
 Asian American/Pacific Islander
 Black/African American
 Hispanic/Latino
 Native American/Alaskan native
   White/Caucasian
 Other Racial/Ethnic Group
9. Did you attend formal leadership training while you were in the Navy?
 Don’t know/Not applicable
 No
 Yes
Please state school/training attended__________________________________
Approximate y ear_______________
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Part 2. NAVY LEADERSHIP: For each itsm, please circle the number that best indicates the 
degree to which you agree or disagree with the foOoMring statements about Navy 
leadership.
I i5 « Strongly agree s  ;
4 = Agree S’ >
3* Neither agree nor disagree I f  f
2=Disagree f  J 5 §
1 = Strongly disagree > «  8 |
0 » Don't tarowfltot applicable 4  f  §  §  > *
I  n o  e  a e
_______________________________________________ I  i !  1  i  i
‘10. Navy leadership theory and practice changed during the tune I 
served on active duty.
0 1 2  | 3 4 . 5 :
i 1 ! ;
11. If your answ er to  the  previous Item was a  4  or S, p lease  rate the I 
following statem ent. Otherwise, go on to  the next Ham.
The change in Navy leadership theory and practice during the time I | 0 
served on active duty w as for the good of the Navy. j
1
! : : ' 
1 ; 1 : 
2  i 3 ;4  I 5 ;
i !
12. Navy leadership is becoming more Gke civilian leadership. ■ 0 1 2 i 3 : 4 5
13. If your answ er to  the  previous ltam was a  4  or 5, p lease rate the 
following s ta tem en t Otherwise, go on to  the next Ham.
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian leadership is good for 
the Navy
| 0 1 2  ! 3 ! 4 i 5 '
14. Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam. ; 0 1 2  i 3 ; 4 | 5 !
i ' • :
15. If your answ er to  the  previous Hem was a  4 or 6, p lease  rate tha 
following sta tem en t Otherwise, go on to  the next Hem.






2  1 3 ; 4 15 1
! : 1 :
! i :
16. Courage is a key component of Navy leadership. i ° 1 2  j 3 >4 : 5I :
17. Leadership is a gender-neutral term. i 0I
1 2  j 3 ; 4 j ® j
18. I feei good about the direction Navy leadership is heading. ! 0 1 2 | 3 | 4 j 5 j
19. Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadershq?. : 0 1 2 j 3 1 4  j 5 :
20. Navy leadership significantly changed due to the post-Cold War 
drawdown.
; o 1 2  | 3 1 4 ; 5 :
! ! i ■
21. There is a  difference between moral and physical courage. ! 0 1 2  j 3 i 4 I 5 ;
j ! >
22. Peacetime leadership is different than wartime leadership. | 0 1
__
2 ! 3 4 j 5 1i 1 »
2
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3 = Neither agree nor disagree S ? 2  
2 = Disagree |  |  *  |  
1 = Strongly disagree « •< ? ;  
0 = Don’t  know/Nat appilcafale « |  |  |  3
8 i  S & £  £ 
? 1 i  1 i  i
23. Navy leadership significantly changed since the 1991 TaQhook ; 0 
scandal. J ’ i 2
j
3 | 4  5
1
1!
24. My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how the {0 
post-Cold War draw down was handled by senior Navy leaders.
1 | 2 3 j4  1 5
11
25. Moral courage is more important to leadership than physical . 0 
courage.
1 \ 2 3 4 ! 5
26. Tailhook was more a  catalyst for changes in Navy leadership than [ 0 
the draw down (down sizing). ; M 2 3
4  • 5
27. Current Navy leadership is too political. ! 0 1 ! 2 3
t
4  5
28. The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are too many . 0 
“warriors” in senior positions. 1 ; 2
I
3 4  5




3 4  1 5
30. The draw down was more a  catalyst for changes in Navy leadership i 0 
than Tailhook. j
1 ! 2 3 i 4  : 5
i
31. Current Navy leadership is not political enough. j 0 1 ! 2 3 1 4 : 51
32. My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased because of how j 0 
Tailhook was handled by senior Navy leaders.
I
1 !2 3 4  5
33. The problem with Navy leadership today is that there are not j 0 
enough “warriors* in senior positions.
1 j 2 3 4  ; 5
34. Technology (the information age) has contributed to changes in ; 0 
Navy leadership. j
1 12 3 4  5
35. If your answer to  th e  previous item w as a  4 or 5, please rate the j 
following sta tem en t Otherwise, go on to  the next item. I 
The changes that technology has contributed to Navy leadership i 0 
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37. If you were to pick a  year that most significantly marks a  change in Navy leadership, that 
year would b e ___________
38. Which of the following years was most pivotal to changes in post-Vietnam Navy 
leadership?
 1975  1979  1985  1991  1994
 O th e r________
I chose that year because:
Please use the space below to write comments about Navy leadership issues or about 
the survey.
Thank you for your time.
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APPENDIX D CONSENT TO ACT AS AN INTERVIEW RESEARCH PARTICIPANT
1. I agree to be interviewed about my position as____________________ on board
____________________ . I realize that this one on one interview will be audio taped.
2. I understand that no risk to me as a result of this interview is anticipated and that 
minimal fatigue on my part is likely to occur. I realize that if I shall require a break 
for any reason, I can request one. I understand that this interview affords me an 
opportunity to discuss my position (former position) as
_______________________, and that by sharing my insight and knowledge with
others, I may positively impact the lives of the men and women of the United 
States Navy.
3. I understand that my participation in this study is strictly voluntary, I may stop the 
interview at any time I desire, and that I may at anytime withdraw my consent to 
use the information derived from this interview without fear of repercussion.
4. I understand that at anytime I have the opportunity to ask questions about the 
research I am participating in, and that the researcher will address my question in a 
truthful manner.
5. I agree to conduct this interview, not to exceed one hour, and if requested, I will 
consider making myself available to successive interviews as necessary, and within 
reason.
6. I realize that my identity will not be revealed and that no data will be used that can 
identify me.
7. There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that expressed in this consent 
form.
8. I understand that I will be provided a transcript of this interview.
9. I feel no obligation to assist the interviewer based on his military position.
I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and on that basis, I give consent to 
my voluntary participation in this research.
Signature of Participant Date
Signature of Principal Researcher Date
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APPENDIX E CONSENT TO ACT AS A SURVEY RESEARCH PARTICIPANT
1. I agree to participate in a survey____________________ on board
2. I understand that this survey affords me an opportunity to express my view on Navy 
leadership, and that by sharing my insight and knowledge with others, I may positively 
impact the lives of the men and women of the United States Navy.
3. I understand that my participation in this survey is strictly voluntary.
4. I understand that at anytime I have the opportunity to ask questions about the research 
I am participating in, and that the administrator will address my question in a truthful 
manner.
5. 1 realize that my identity will be kept confidential that no data will be used that can 
identify me.
6. There is no agreement, written or verbal, beyond that expressed in this consent form.
7. I feel no obligation to assist the administrator based on his or her military position.
I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and on that basis, I give consent to
my voluntary participation in this survey.
Signature of Participant Date
Signature of Administrator Date
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APPENDIX F LETTER TO MILITARY COMMANDERS
« d a t e »
« n a m e »
« a d d r e s s »
_ AUTOTEXTLIST _Dear _ « ra n k  and n a m e »
I am in the Navy Doctoral Program in  Leadership Studies a t the University of 
San Diego. My dissertation proposal, Changes in Navy Leadership Theory and 
Practice: Post-Vietnam, will involve surveys, interviews, and a review of pertinent 
Navy documents. I am  writing you for permission to interview Navy personnel, 
on a not to interfere basis of course, to ascertain if our Navy officers and senior 
enlisted believe that Navy leadership has changed post-Vietnam, and if they do 
believe change has occurred, what w ere the possible causes? My results will be 
shared w ith the Navy through the Chief of Naval Education and Training or 
whatever avenue is deemed most appropriate.
Thank you for your time.
N. A  Trongale 
Captain, U.S. Navy
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APPENDIX G LETTER TO VETERANS GROUPS
« d a te »
Dear Commander «  name»,
I am an active duty Navy Captain and a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) 
post # 2801 in Villa Park, Illinois I am also a part time student at the University of San 
Diego, conducting research in the area of leadership for a doctoral dissertation. My 
research project is titled, Changes m Navy Leadership Theory and Practice: Post- 
Vietnam. Since the Vietnam War, Navy leadership theory and practice appears to be 
changing, becoming more like current civilian leadership theory and practice. Indicators of 
this shift can be seen in journal writings, the new Navy performance evaluation structure, 
current Navy leadership training, and by the birth of a Navy Command Leadership School.
My study will address: (1) How, if at all, has Navy leadership theory and practice 
changed? (2) If Navy leadership theory and practice did change, what caused those 
changes? And (3) How, if at all, do significant events that impact history affect Navy 
leadership theory and practice.
I am writing you for an introduction to your Navy post members who might be interested 
in granting a confidential interview and/or filling out a confidential survey (copy attached) 
that will help answer the above mentioned questions. Their opinions and experiences are 
valued, and add credibility to the results. The results of my study will be shared with the 
Navy and those participating individuals who request them.
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APPENDIX H LEADERSHIP SURVEY ITEM FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS 
This appendix contains three frequency distributions: Vietnam-era sample, 
weighted post-Vietnam sample, and unweighted post-Vietnam sample. The percentage of 
participants who answered each possible response category is listed next to each survey 
question. The percentages that appear in columns headed by T% are total response 
percentages, i.e., these percentages account for all participants including those who 
answered Don’t know/Not applicable or who left the item blank. The percentages listed 
under V% are “valid” percentages, i.e., the percentage calculated after responses of Don’t 
know/Not applicable/Blank have been removed from the total.
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Table H-l
Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Vietnam-era Participants




T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed 0,0 3,9 3.9 15,2 15,2 8,4 8.4 40,4 40,4 32,0 32,0
during the time I served on active duty,
The change in Navy leadership theory and 28,1 20,8 28,9 24,7 34,4 9.0 12.5 15,2 21.1 2,2 3,1
practice during the time I served on active duty 
was for the good of the Navy.
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian 9.5 1.7 1,9 7.9 8,7 8,4 9,3 48,3 53,4 24,2 26.7
leadership.
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian 28,1 37,6 52,3 28,1 39.1 2,2 3,1 3,4 4.7 0,6 0,8
leadership is good for the Navy
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam. 6.2 0.0 0,0 1,7 1.8 1.1 1.2 47.8 50,9 43,3 46,1
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is 10.1 39,9 44,4 29,2 32,5 6,7 7.5 12,4 13,8 1,7 1,9
for the good of the Navy.
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Level of agreement
Item NA
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed 
during the time I served on active duty.
0.0 3.9 3.9 15.2 15.2 8.4 8,4 40.4 40.4 32.0 32.0
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership. 0.6 1.7 1.7 4.5 4.5 4,5 4.5 24.7 24.9 64,0 64.4
Leadership is a gender-neutral term. 3,4 2.8 2.9 5.6 5.8 8.4 8.7 42.7 44.2 37.1 38.4
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is 
heading.
7.3 36,0 38.8 32.6 35.2 16.9 18,2 6,2 6.7 1.1 1.2
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership. 2.2 1.7 1.7 8.4 8.6 4.5 4.6 38.8 39,7 44.4 45.4
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the 
post-Cold War drawdown.
11.8 2.8 3.2 10.1 11.5 19.1 21.7 47,2 53.5 9.0 10,2
There is a difference between moral and physical 
courage.
0.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 2.8 2.8 42.1 42.4 45,5 45,8
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime 
leadership.
0.6 15.2 15.3 18.0 18.1 5.6 5.6 39.3 39.5 21,3 21.5
Navy leadership significantly changed since the
1 A  A  1 T 1 n i l  L  / \  ̂  1 r  n A A M / l / t l


















Changes in Leadership Theory
Level of agreement
Item NA
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed 0.0 3.9 3,9 15,2 15.2 8.4 8,4 40.4 40,4 32.0 32.0
during the time I served on active duty.
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased 10,7 1,1 1,3 7,3 8,2 19,7 22,0 43,3 48,4 18,0 20,1
because of how the post-Cold War drawdown 
was handled by senior Navy leaders.
Moral courage is more important to leadership 1.2 2,2 2,3 10,7 10,8 15,2 15,3 36,5 36.9 34,3 34,7
than physical courage.
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in 8,4 4,5 4,9 9,6 10,4 18,5 20,2 39,3 42,9 19,7 21,5
Navy leadership than the drawdown (down
sizing).
Current Navy leadership is too political, 6,7 0.0 0,0 1,7 1,8 9,6 10,2 32,0 34,3 50,0 53,6
The problem with Navy leadership today is that 5,6 54,5 57.7 30,3 32,1 8,4 8,9 1,1 1,2 0,0 0,0
there are too many “warriors” in senior positions.





















Navy leadership theory and practice changed 
during the time I served on active duty.
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes 
in Navy leadership than Tailhook.
Current Navy leadership is not political enough.
My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased 
because of how Tailhook was handled by senior 
Navy leaders.
The problem with Navy leadership today is that 
there are not enough “warriors” in senior 
positions.
Technology (the information age) has 
contributed to changes in Navy leadership.
The changes that technology has contributed to 
Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Level of agreement
NA 1 2 3 4 5
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
0.0 3.9 3.9 15.2 15.2 8.4 8.4 40.4 40.4 32.0 32.0
9.0 9.6 10.5 44.4 48.8 18.0 19.8 18.0 19.8 1.1 1.2
4.5 52.8 55.3 33.1 34.7 7.9 8.2 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.2
2.2 0.6 0.6 3.4 3.4 6.7 6.9 36.0 36.8 51.1 52.3
7.3 2.2 2.4 7.3 7.9 20.2 21.8 36.5 39.4 26.4 28.5
6.2 2.2 2.4 9.6 10.2 19.7 21.0 56.7 60.5 5.6 6.0
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Table H-2
Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Weighted Post-Vietnam Sample 
5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, 0 = Don’t know/Not applicable
Level of agreement
0 1Item
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed 2.2 1.1 1,1 9,2 9,4 8,5 8,7 50,0 51,2 29,0 29,6
during the time I served on active duty.
The change in Navy leadership theory and 21,9 6.8 8.7 17,8 22,8 16,1 20,7 31,3 40,1 6,0 7,7
practice during the time I served on active duty 
was for the good of the Navy.
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian 5,1 4,3 4,6 19,7 20,8 17,9 18,8 40,7 42,9 12,3 12,9
leadership.
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian 49,0 9,7 19,0 20,1 39,4 8,2 16,1 10,7 21,0 2.2 4,4
leadership is good for the Navy
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam, 36,3 0,0 0,0 1,1 1,8 9,0 14.1 27.1 42,6 26,5 41,6
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is 49,0 5,3 10,5 6,7 13.1 10,3 20,2 19,4 38.1 9.3 18,2
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Level of agreement
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
Courage is a key component of Navy leadership. 0.6 2.0 2.0 8.2 8.2 4.3 4,3 45.8 46.0 39.1 39,4
Leadership is a gender-neutral term. 0.2 1.1 1.1 2.6 2,6 5,9 5,9 41.2 41.3 48.9 49,0
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is 
heading.
1.3 8.2 8.3 25.7 26.0 26.1 26.5 31.3 31.7 7.4 7,5
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership, 3.4 2.7 2.8 8.1 8.3 13.3 13.7 38,3 39.7 34,3 35,5
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the 
post-Cold War drawdown.
4.8 1.6 1.7 8,4 8.8 20.6 21.7 44.9 47.1 19,7 20,7
There is a difference between moral and physical 
courage.
0.6 1.2 1.2 2.8 2.8 8.9 9,0 46.1 46,4 40.4 40.6
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime 
leadership.
2.5 6.8 6.9 11.8 12.1 9.1 9,4 42.8 43.9 26,9 27.6
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 
1991 Tailhook scandal.




















My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased 
because of how the post-Cold War drawdown 
was handled by senior Navy leaders.
Moral courage is more important to leadership 
than physical courage.
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in 
Navy leadership than the drawdown (down 
sizing).
Current Navy leadership is too political.
The problem with Navy leadership today is that 
there are too many “warriors” in senior positions,
Physical courage is more important to leadership 
than moral courage.
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes 
in Navy leadership than Tailhook,
Current Navy leadership is not political enough.
(table continues)
Changes in Leadership Theory
Level of agreement
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
~62 L5 L6 19.1 20,4 35,9 38,3 28.4 30,3 8* 9A~
0.4 2.4 2.5 7.3 7.4 28.0 28,1 42,4 42.5 19.4 19.5
6.3 4.0 4.3 18.9 20.2 29,2 31,1 30.6 32.6 11,0 11.7
0.6 0.4 0.4 4.0 4.0 15,9 16,0 39.2 39.4 40,0 40.2
2.3 24.1 24,7 45,3 46.4 23.2 23,8 3.6 3.7 1.4 1.5
0.6 13.8 13.9 49.9 50,2 33.8 34,0 1.2 1.2 0,7 0,7
6.6 5.2 5.6 29.3 31.4 31,7 33.9 25,0 26.8 2.1 2,3



















My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased 
because of how Tailhook was handled by senior 
Navy leaders.
The problem with Navy leadership today is that 
there are not enough “warriors” in senior 
positions.
Technology (the information age) has 
contributed to changes in Navy leadership.
The changes that technology has contributed to 
Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy.
Changes in Leadership Theory
Level of agreement
0 1 2 3 4 5
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
5.4 2.8 3.0 18.9 20.0 36,5 38.6 24,4 25,8 11.9 12,6
2.5 2.5 2.6 15.3 15.7 33,0 33.9 31.1 31.9 15,6 16.0
0.4 0.2 0,2 3,8 3.8 15.1 15,1 60.1 60.3 20,5 20.6
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Table H-3
Leadership Survey Item Frequency Distributions: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Sample 
5 = Strongly agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree, 0 = Don’t know/Not applicable
Level of agreement
Item
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
Navy leadership theory and practice changed 3.2 1.0 1.1 12.0 12.4 10.2 10,5 49,3 50,9 24,3 25,1
during the time I served on active duty.
The change in Navy leadership theory and 27.4 6.0 8.3 17,5 24,1 14.6 20,1 28.2 38.8 6,3 8.6
practice during the time I served on active duty 
was for the good of the Navy.
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian 5.5 4.7 5,0 20,4 21.5 18,5 19,6 40,5 42.8 10,4 11.0
leadership.
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian 50,4 9,9 20,0 18,5 37,4 7.8 15.8 11.2 22.6 2.1 4,2
leadership is good for the Navy
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam. 36,2 0,0 0,0 1.3 2,0 7,8 12,3 29,2 45.9 25,3 39.8
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is 47.8 4,4 8,5 6.5 12.5 11,2 21.5 20,6 39,5 9,4 18.0




















Courage is a key component of Navy leadership.
Leadership is a gender-neutral term.
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership is 
heading.
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership,
Navy leadership significantly changed due to the 
post-Cold War drawdown,
There is a difference between moral and physical 
courage.
Peacetime leadership is different than wartime 
leadership.
Navy leadership significantly changed since the 
1991 Tailhook scandal.
(table continues!
Changes in Leadership Theory
Level of agreement
0 1 2 3 4 5
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
0.8 2,6 2.6 7.8 7.9 5,2 5.3 45.4 45,8 38.1 38.4
0.3 1.3 1.3 2.9 2.9 5.5 5.5 42.0 42.1 48.0 48.2
1.3 7.8 7.9 27.2 27.5 26,6 27,0 30.0 30.4 7,0 7.1
4.5 3,1 3,3 7,3 7,7 11.2 11.7 38,6 40.4 35.2 36,9
6,6 1,3 1.4 8.9 9.5 19,1 20,4 44.4 47,5 19,8 21,2
0.8 1.8 1.8 3.1 3.2 7.0 7,1 45.4 45.8 41,8 42,1
3,1 7.0 7.3 12.8 13,2 7.0 7,3 44.1 45,6 25.8 26.7


















My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased 
because of how the post-Cold War drawdown 
was handled by senior Navy leaders.
Moral courage is more important to leadership 
than physical courage.
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in 
Navy leadership than the drawdown (down 
sizing).
Current Navy leadership is too political,
The problem with Navy leadership today is that 
there are too many “warriors” in senior positions.
Physical courage is more important to leadership 
than moral courage.
The drawdown was more a catalyst for changes 
in Navy leadership than Tailhook.
Current Navy leadership is not political enough.
(table continues')
Changes in Leadership Theory
Level of agreement
1
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
L6 L7 19,1 20.8 34.5 37.6 27.2 29.6 9A KU"
0.5 2.9 2,9 8.1 8.1 27,2 27,3 41.0 41,2 20.4 20.5
8.1 4.7 5.1 19,1 20.7 27,2 29.5 30.5 33,2 10.4 11,4
0.8 0.5 0.5 5.0 5.0 13,1 13.2 41.5 41,8 39,2 39.5
2.6 28,5 29,2 45.2 46,4 20.1 20.6 2.6 2.7 1.0 1,1
0,8 14.4 14.5 50,4 50.8 32.4 32.6 1.6 1.6 0.5 0.5
8.1 5.7 6.3 31,6 34,4 28.5 31.0 24.3 26,4 1.8 2.0



















My faith in senior Navy leadership decreased 
because of how Tailhook was handled by senior 
Navy leaders.
The problem with Navy leadership today is that 
there are not enough “warriors” in senior 
positions.
Technology (the information age) has 
contributed to changes in Navy leadership.
The changes that technology has contributed to 
Navy leadership are for the good of the Navy.
(table continues)
Changes in Leadership Theory
Level of agreement
0 1 2 3 4 5
T% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V% T% V%
7.3 3.1 3,4 17.8 19.2 30,5 33,0 26,1 28,2 15,1 16.3
2.9 2.9 3.0 14.4 14.8 31,6 32.5 30.5 31,5 17.8 18,3
0.6 0.3 0.3 3,9 3.9 13.8 13,9 60.6 60.9 20.9 21.0
20.7 0.8 1.0 9.9 12.5 14.1 17.8 43.9 55.3 10,7 13.5
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APPENDIX I LEADERSHIP SURVEY USING UNWEIGHTED POST-VIETNAM
DATA
Statistical test results using unweighted, post-Vietnam data.
118

















Changes in Leadership Theory
Table I-1
Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples





















Courage is a key component 
of Navy leadership
4.46 4.09 4.13” 4.45 4.15 2.75” 4.56 4.09 3.53**
Leadership is a gender-neutral 
term
4.09 4.33 -2.97’* 4.10 4.34 -2.33 4.14 4.30 -1.28
There is a difference between 
moral and physical courage
4.20 4.23 -.34 4.19 4.38 -1.84 4.19 4.16 .25
Peacetime leadership is 
different than wartime 
leadership
3.34 3.71 -3.06” 3.30 3.52 -1.43 3.19 3.71 -2.64”
Moral courage is more 
important to leadership than 
physical courage
3.91 3.68 2.46 3.90 3.71 1.55 3.92 3.63 2.05
Physical courage is more 
important to leadership than 
moral courage
2.04 2.23
_-2.75 2.05 2.23 -1.95 1.92 2.25 -3.36”
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Table 1-2
Means and T-tests for Nature of Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples



















Courage is a key component of 
Navy leadership
4.12 3.86 1.18 4.08 4.18 -.77 4.01 4.15 -1.24
Leadership is a gender-neutral 
term
4.34 4.50 -.91 4.33 4.33 .02 4.30 4.31 -.13
There is a difference between 
moral and physical courage
4.25 4.27 -.15 4.29 3.97 2.76“ 4.14 4.37 -2.53
Peacetime leadership is 
different than wartime 
leadership
3.69 4.00 -1.48 3.74 3.59 .90 3.89 3.48 2.96“
Moral courage is more 
important to leadership than 
physical courage
3.68 3.82 -.63 3.73 3.46 2.03 3.69 3.70 -.07
Physical courage is more 
important to leadership than 
moral courage
2.22 2.19 .21 2.19 2.40 -2.17 2.25 2.24 .18
♦♦pc.Ol
120
Changes in Leadership Theory
Table 1-3
Means and T-tests for Nature o f  Leadership Ttems: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples hv Pay
Grade/Rank
Item Pay grade/rank
E-7 to E-9 
(N = 86)





Courage is a  key component o f 
Navy leadership
4.17 4.06 4.21 <1.00
Leadership is a gender-neutral term 4.33 4.33 4.33 <1.00
There is a difference between moral 
and physical courage
4.15 4.29 4.00 2.04
Peacetime leadership is different 
than wartime leadership
3.78 3.72 3.36 1.48
Moral courage is more important to 
leadership than physical courage
3.76 3.71 3.36 2.09
Physical courage is more important 
to leadership than moral courage
2.30 2.19 2.30 <1.00
** p  < .01
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Table 1-4
Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Naw Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples
Item Total sample Aviators only Triangulation sample
Vietnam Post- 
-era Vietnam 


















Current Navy leadership is too 
political
4.40 4.15 3.23” 4.42 4.28 1.51 4.46 4.06 3.28”
Current Navy leadership is not 
political enough
1.58 1.79 -2.99” 1.57 1.70 -1.39 1.47 1.83 -3.43”
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are too many “warriors” in 
senior positions
1.54 2.00 -6.24” 1.52 1.78 -3.01” 1.39 2.20 -6.89”
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are not enough “warriors” in 
senior positions
3.84 3.47 3.76” 3.87 3.68 1.57 3.91 3.37 3.75”
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Table 1-5
Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Naw Leadership: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples

















Current Navy leadership is too 
political
4.18 3.82 1.90 4.18 4.00 1.53 4.01 4.29 -2.78’*
Current Navy leadership is not 
political enough
1.78 1.91 -.75 1.76 1.93 -1.53 1.84 1.67 1.83
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are too many “warriors” in 
senior positions
1.96 2.48 -2.72” 1.96 2.21 -2.15 2.15 1.73 4.40”
The problem with Navy 
leadership today is that there 
are not enough “warriors” in 
senior positions
3.51 2.84 2.72” 3.51 3.28 1.62 3.36 3.68 -2.67”
** p  < .01
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Table 1-6
Means and T-tests for Attitudes Towards Current Navy Leadership Items: T Tnweighted Post- 
Vietnam Samples hv Pav Grade/Rank
Item Pay grade/rank




0-5 /0-6  
(N=  33)
F-ratio
Current Navy leadership is too 
political
4.06 4.22 3.85 3.25
Current Navy leadership is not 
political enough
2.05 1.70 1.67 6.74"
The problem with Navy leadership 
today is that there are too many 
“warriors” in senior positions
2.42 1.83 1.72 16.95"
The problem with Navy leadership 
today is that there are not enough 
“warriors” in senior positions
3.31 3.53 3.55 1.49
**p < .01
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Table 1-7
Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples






















Navy leadership theory and 
practice changed during the time I 
served on active duty
3.81 3.87 -.51 3.82 3.84 -.12 4.25 4.16 .73
The change in Navy leadership 
theory and practice was for the 
good of the Navy*
2.35 3.13 -6.24** 2.35 2.99 -4.09“ 2.27 3.21 -5.45“
Navy leadership is becoming 
more like civilian leadership
3.94 3.33 6.54*’ 3.93 3.38 4.62” 3.97 3.33 4.26“
Navy leadership becoming more 
like civilian leadership is good for 
the Navy*
1.63 2.51 -7.87“ 1.62 2.21 -4.03“ 1.58 2.42 -4.86“
Navy leadership has changed 
since Vietnamb
4.41 4.23 2.58“ 4.41 4.25 1.87 4.49 4.21 2.74“
The change in Navy leadership 
since Vietnam is for the good of 
the Navy*
1.95 3.39 -11.56“ 1.93 3.22 -8.17” 1.99 3.45 -7.80“
I feel good about the direction 
Navy leadership is heading
1.96 3.01 -11.13“ 1.96 2.97 -8.25“ 1.87 3.12 -8.68“
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.
b Between 27% and 36% of the post-Vietnam sample answered this item “Don’t know/not applicable.”


















Changes in Leadership Theory
Table 1-8
Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples
Item______________________ Gender_____________________ Race/Ethnicity_______________ Designator_______________
Men Women /-value White Non- /-value Surface Aviation /-value 
(N = 349 (N = 22) (N= white warfare (Â =139)
316) (N= 67) (N =
Navy leadership theory and 3.90 3.52 1.74 3.81 4.13 -2.58 3.97 3.80 1.55
practice changed during the 
time I served on active duty
The change in Navy leadership 3.09 3.75 -3.40** 3.06 3.43 -2.15 3.28 2.93 2.31
theory and practice was for the 
good of the Navy®
Navy leadership is becoming 3.36 3.19 .68 3.37 3.18 1.23 3.27 3.37 -.82
more like civilian leadership
Navy leadership becoming 2.47 2.90 -1,12 2.44 2.88 -1.91 2.69 2.15 3.05*
more like civilian leadership is 
good for the Navy®
Navy leadership has changed 4.25 4.19 .35 4.22 4.29 -.56 4.25 4.23 .22
since Vietnamb
The change in Navy leadership 3.38 3.35 .09 3.36 3.58 -.92 3.61 3.15 2.38
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I feel good about the direction 
Navy leadership is heading
2.99 3.32 -1.36 2.95 3.31 -2.51 3.08 2.92 1.25
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.
b Except in the case of gender (with all but one woman responding to the item), between 27% and 37% of Post-Vietnam samples 
answered this item “Don’t know/not applicable.”
♦♦pc.Ol
127
Changes in Leadership Theory
Table 1-9
Means and T-tests for Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples hv Pav 
Grade/Rank
Item Pay grade/rank
E-7 to E-9 
(N = 86)







Navy leadership theory and practice changed 
during the time I served on active duty
4.28 3.68 3.94 13.28*’
The change in Navy leadership theory and 
practice was for the good of the Navy*
3.22 3.09 3.10 <1.00
Navy leadership is becoming more like civilian 
leadership
3.47 3.29 3.24 <1.00
Navy leadership becoming more like civilian 
leadership is good for the Navy*
2.59 2.55 2.41 <1.00
Navy leadership has changed since Vietnam15 4.23 4.28 4.15 <1.00
The change in Navy leadership since Vietnam is 
for the good o f the Navy*
3.34 3.46 3.65 <1.00
I feel good about the direction Navy leadership 
is heading
3.18 2.95 3.00 1.33
a Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.
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Table I-10
Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Vietnam-Era and Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples
Item_______________________ Total sample________________ Aviators only________________ Triangulation sample________
Vietnam Post- /-value Vietnam Post- /-value Vietnam Post- /-value 
-era Vietnam -era Vietnam -era Vietnam
(V= (V= (V= (JV= (W=73) (.N
178) 383)______________ 170) 146)_______________________ =162)___________
Technology
Technology has contributed to 3.57 3.98 -5.43° 3.55 3.87 -3.52”  3.56 3.98 -3.72”
changes in Navy leadership
The changes that technology has 3.31 3.68 -3.67”  3.31 3.77 -3.97”  3.35 3.73 -2.39
contributed to Navy leadership 
are for the good of the Navy8
Tailhonk
Tailhook greatly affected Navy 4.18 4.00 1.95 4.19 4.26 -.61 4.29 3.94 2.55
leadership
Navy leadership significantly 4.16 3.90 2.98”  4.18 4.09 .95 4.23 3.86 2.73
changed since the 1991 Tailhook
scandal
My faith in senior Navy 4.37 3.35 12.21” 4.40 3.66 6.53”  4.40 3.22 9.34’
leadership decreased because of 
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Item Total sample Aviators only Triangulation sample
Vietnam Post- 
-era Vietnam 


















Navy leadership significantly 
changed due to the post-Cold 
War drawdown
3.56 3.78 -2.41 3.55 3.73 -1.55 3.57 3.72 -1.10
My faith in senior Navy 
leadership decreased because of 
how the drawdown was handled
3.78 3.26 5.78** 3.78 3.56 3.69** 3.84 3.17 5.18”
Tailhook versus drawdown 
Tailhook was more a catalyst for 
changes in Navy leadership than 
the drawdown
3.66 3.25 4.00’* 3.70 3.51 1.53 3.52 3.21 1.99
The drawdown was more a 
catalyst for changes in Navy 
leadership than Tailhook
2.52 2.84 -3.41” 2.50 2.62 -1.11 2.53 2.86 -2.39
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.
** p  < .01
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Table 1-11
Means and T-tests for Events Contributing to Change in Leadership Items: Unweighted Post-Vietnam Samples



















Technology has contributed to 
changes in Navy leadership
The changes that technology has 
contributed to Navy leadership 
are for the good of the Navy*
Tailhook
Tailhook greatly affected Navy 
leadership
Navy leadership significantly 
changed since the 1991 Tailhook 
scandal
My faith in senior Navy 
leadership decreased because of 
how Tailhook was handled
Drawdown
Navy leadership significantly 
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My faith in senior Navy 
leadership decreased because of 
how the drawdown was handled
3.28 3.05 1.32 3.27 3.19 .63 3.18 3.39 -1.83
Tailhook versus drawdown 
Tailhook was more a catalyst for 
changes in Navy leadership than 
the drawdown
3.24 3.35 -.46 3.25 3.23 .14 3.03 3.51 -3.91*’
The drawdown was more a 
catalyst for changes in Navy 
leadership than Tailhook
2.85 2.80 .21 2.80 2.98 -1.59 3.08 2.59 4.47”
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with previous item.
**/><.01
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Table 1-12
Vietnam Samples bv Pav Grade/Rank
Item Pay grade/rank









Technology has contributed to changes in 
Navy leadership
3.93 4.00 4.09 <1.00
The changes that technology has 
contributed to Navy leadership are for the 
good of the Navy*
Tailhook
3.79 3.67 3.50 1.18
Tailhook greatly affected Navy leadership 3.90 4.06 3.94 <1.00
Navy leadership significantly changed since 
the 1991 Tailhook scandal
3.84 3.95 3.94 <1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership 
decreased because ofhow  Tailhook was 
handled
Drawdown
3.00 3.47 3.61 7.24**
Navy leadership significantly changed due 
to the Post-Cold War drawdown
3.73 3.81 3.73 <1.00
My faith in senior Navy leadership 
decreased because ofhow the drawdown 
was handled
Tailhook versus drawdown
3.21 3.29 3.27 <1.00
Tailhook was more a catalyst for changes in 
Navy leadership than the drawdown
3.38 3.19 3.39 1.25
The drawdown was more a catalyst for 
changes in Navy leadership than Tailhook
2.98 2.85 2.42 4.10
* Item answered only by participants who agreed or strongly agreed with, previous item. 
**p<M
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APPENDIX J SURVEY COMMENTS 
Each individual who participated in the leadership survey was offered the 
opportunity to comment about leadership or about the survey in general Written 
comments many times reveal the thoughts of individuals and personalize impersonal 
quantitative data. A summary o f the “written, self-generated comments may make the 
quantitative results more meaningful by uncovering some o f the feelings behind the 
numbers" (Hollingsworth, p. vii). According to Hollingsworth, when individuals are 
afforded the opportunity to submit written comments, they tend to paint a negative picture 
by expressing their concerns and criticisms rather than their satisfactions and joys. 
Approximately 70 % of post-Vietnam veterans who participated in the survey chose to 
write remarks in the comments section o f the survey. Over 90 % o f Vietnam-era veterans 
remarked in the comment section o f the survey; many sent personal letters, others emailed 
additional thoughts, and some sent in articles they felt would help the researcher with the 
study. Also, many Vietnam-era veterans provided their names, addresses, telephone 
numbers, and email addresses.
Vietnam-era Veteran Survey Comments
The following is a summary o f the comment section of the surveys provided by 
Vietnam-era veterans, the majority o f whom are combat veterans and aviators. Very 
similar themes are expressed by both groups of Navy veterans. However, Vietnam-era 
veterans are much more critical o f the current president, the Clinton Administration, and
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women in combat positions. The researcher extracted a number o f themes from the survey 
remarks o f Vietnam-era veterans and selected comments that supported the topics.
Leadership
Vietnam veterans expressed concern about senior Navy leadership and the 
direction senior leadership has taken since Vietnam. The following comments were chosen 
to frame how Vietnam-era veterans generally felt about Navy leadership.
"They [Navy leadership] should have resigned rather than carry out bad policy," 
(Participant 11).
"Straight talking naval leadership should not change with the times, technology or 
whatever...” (Participant 721‘).
"Now it is hard to find a leader worthy to lead you around the block much less into 
combat," (Participant 32).
"There is no leadership," (Participant 236).
"Navy leadership has become more concerned with being politically correct and 
protecting their own careers than leading,” (Participant 25).
"Senior leaders are perceived by the troops as being more interested in their 
personal careers than in helping the average sailor or JO (junior officer],” (Participant 57).
"Senior officers are more concerned about their careers than about duty, honor, 
[and] country,” (Participant 92).
12 This comment was submitted by a retired Vice Admiral who signed his name to the
survey.
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"Our Navy’s ‘so called’ leaders are a bunch o f wimps with zero morals who are
only concerned about their next star or future civilian job plus their retired pay," 
(Participant 101).
"Until the dag [admiral] officers o f the Navy gain the moral courage to tell the real 
story of ‘Naval Readiness’ [the ability of the Navy to respond to a crisis] little or nothing 
will change,” (Participant 449).
Social Experimentation.
Some Vietnam-era veterans were concerned about using the Navy as a testing 
ground for social experimentation. This position is illustrated by the following comments.
"The most surprising and discouraging aspect of this [liberalism] is the lack of 
fortitude on the part of our military leaders in opposing societal and cultural changes to 
the U.S. armed forces that clearly degrade its effectiveness, “(Participant 103).
"When Adm. Zumwaft'3 was CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] he effectively 
destroyed the 'chain of comm and’ [Zumwalt’s modernization of the Navy was viewed by 
many as changing the fundamental way the Navy gave orders and kept discipline] and 
unless that has been re-established since 1983 we are still in trouble. I do believe some real
13 Many survey participants stated that the Zumwalt era represented a time for significant 
change in Navy leadership. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt was the Chief of Naval Operations from 
1970 to 1974. Zumwalt, a Naval Academy graduate and youngest officer ever to be promoted to 
the rank of rear admiral, was known for initiating wide-ranging reforms in a effort to revitalize the 
Navy during a time when the Navy and the country was in the middle of a long and extremely 
unpopular war, domestic social reform movements, and race riots on board aircraft carriers. In an 
attempt to close the gap that developed between society and the traditional Navy, Zumwalt tried to 
modernize Navy personnel policies and make the Navy more attractive to young recruits.
Zumwalt’s initiatives came out in messages called Z-NavOps or as they were referred to in the fleet 
at the time, Z-grams. Perhaps two of Zumwalt’s most farsighted Z-grams were equal opportunity, 
and equal rights and opportunities for women in the Navy.
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leaders, Adm. Arthur for instance, took hits from Tailhook ‘91 but the chain of command 
had not been reestablished by then. I don’t believe women are the problem but I don’t 
know—I haven’t served since they have been on ships. I do believe they are a retention
14
problem,” (Participant 113).
“The military is no place for affirmative action.”(Participant 63).
"Current civilian government leaders are using the military for a social experiment 
rather than training our service men & women to win & survive in time of war,” 
(Participant 328).
Marine Corps Leadership.
Some Vietnam-era veterans expressed that despite the same environmental 
influences, the Marine Corps leadership was able to maintain focus and remain true to its 
beliefs. This conviction can be seen in the following four comments.
"As o f now, the only military group that is standing to its principles is the Marine 
Corps (Marine Corps does not allow men and women to go through bootcamp together]. 
The other services are bending to the TC' [political correctness] o f the Clinton 
Administration and militant females," (Participant 402).
"Navy leadership, along with the other services, with the possible exception o f the 
Marine Corps, have allowed the Clinton administration to degrade our military capabilities
14 Admiral Arthur, a combat aviator and well respected as a warrior, had his career ended 
after he refused to reverse a decision to remove a female aviator from flight status because of poor 
performance grades. By virtue of his apolitical position, the Senate never confirmed Arthur’s next 
assignment. The Chief of Naval Operations at die time, Admiral Boorda, did not support him. So, 
without a position to move into, he was forced to retire. Because he sacrificed his career for what 
he believed, Arthur is considered a hero by many in the Navy. Arthur is mentioned on numerous 
occasions by survey participants.
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with hardly a protest from the service chiefs. The Navy leadership has not stood behind
their ’Warriors' in high levels (Adm. Stan Arthur for example) and have allowed the
political correct, left wingers to intimidate them," (Participant 297).
"Clinton’s announcement o f his advocacy o f gays in the military could probably 
[have] been squelched had the Joint Chiefs threatened (behind scenes) to resign en masse 
if he pursued that tack—but they did not,” (Participant 5).
Clinton Administration.
Many Vietnam-era veterans expressed strong negative views about the Clinton 
Administration, President Clinton, and how the views and policies of his administration 
have adversely affected the Navy. No longer serving on active duty, the Vietnam-era 
veterans can openly and legally criticize the commander in chief unlike veterans serving 
on active duty. The following five comments are characteristic o f the views o f many 
Vietnam-era veterans.
"Current commander in chief has done more to degrade our overall military and 
truly doesn’t get any respect from our current active duty officers," (Participant 98).
"The 'one world' attitude o f this administration is criminal and must be reversed if 
we are to survive," (Participant 155).
"Having a commander-in-chief who lacks moral courage undermines the chain of 
command down to the lowest ranks,” (Participant 284).
"This present administration has done more to destroy Military leadership than any 
thing else,” (Participant 7).
"Without a commander in chief for 7-8 years that knew anything about the 
military, it was obvious to me that the military would decline,” (Participant 239).
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Technological Advancements.
For some Vietnam-era veterans, increased technological advancements are seen as 
a negative contributor to current state o f Navy leadership. This point of view can be seen 
in the following two comments.
"Technology has increased senior leadership’s ability to micromanage,"
(Participant 342).
‘Technology is a tool, nothing more or less, that is managed rather than led,” 
(Participant 75).
Political Correctness.
Many Vietnam-era veterans expressed resolute concerns about political 
correctness, and the role of women and homosexuals in the military, and the overall 
political nature o f senior Navy leadership. For them, leadership’s failure to take a stand on 
political issues has greatly contributed to the contemporary state of Navy leadership. The 
researcher chose the following five comments to illustrate the volatile nature o f 
aforementioned issues.
"...you can not have an effective military fighting machine and run it like 
IBM... What does Pat Schroeder [former Congresswoman from Colorado who 
championed equality for women in the military] know about combat operations ?" 
(Participant 127).
139
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory 
"The problem is that Navy leaders are not permitted to lead because of DOD 
policies. Kara Hultgren would be alive today if Navy leaders could have made decisions
based upon ability rather than gender,”15 (Participant 196).
"John Lehman was a disaster to the Navy! His firing of good leaders created a pool
16
of politicians, not leaders!” (Participant 389).
"Social pressures have changed the leadership. (O’clubs [officers clubs] closing, do 
not drink, worried about stock prices). Too many politicians, not enough warriors," 
(Participant 274).
"GOOD LUCK. I’m glad my Navy days are over. Too much bullshit," (Participant
119).
Women in Comhat.
Many Vietnam-era veterans opposed the notion of opening up the role of combat 
to women. Some opposed the notion for ideological reasons while others felt that the 
implementation process and motivation was flawed. The following four comments were 
chosen to express these opinions.
15 Lieutenant Kara Hultgren was killed when her F-L4 Tomcat crashed behind the USS 
Abraham Lincoln during a day carrier landing. Many aviators believed that Hultgren, one of the 
first females to fly in a combat capable fighter squadron, was pushed too fast through training. 
They believe that she was not prepared to fly the Tomcat and that the Navy refused to acknowledge 
that because it wanted to appease Congress by demonstrating that it was fully supportive of having 
women in combat aviation.
16 John Lehman was the Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan Administration.
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"Women do not belong in combat or in combat units. It destroys morale & combat 
effectiveness—men & women are different—they think differently & act differently—In 
combat, you don’t have time to answer the feminist question How do you feel about 
that?—A man wants to know what do you think about that (& disregard your feelings) & 
take action. As a flight instructor, I have taught both men & women to fly—& have yet to 
see any women I would want as a wingman or leader in combat. Combat units must have 
complete faith in each other & work together closer than most families do. Women just 
don’t fit in! Check back & see how the Israelis trained their combat pilots for their wars 
up through 1967—They had a superb record—women would not fit into that regime o f 
training & daily life—neither would homosexuals," (Participant 427).
"In the 1970s military leadership started to crumple in the face of increasing 
pressures from the feminists  whose interests were narrowly focused on an across-the- 
board advancement o f females with little or no regard for the impact of the movement on 
national security. Tailhook provided the breakthrough that opened the floodgates to 
women in the military by providing the political leverage needed in Washington. Kelso 
[Navy] and McPeak [Air Force] were prime enablers. It was at this point that the military 
services became a laboratory for social experimentation and the nation lost sight of the 
primary mission of the military, which is to ensure national security through COMBAT 
readiness and performance,” 7 (Participant 42).
17 Admiral Kelso was the Chief of Naval Operations and General McPeak was the Air 
Force Chief of Staff during and after Tailhook.
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"The integration of females into Navy has had far-reaching negative impact on
morale and has overly complicated personnel assignment considerations. It has placed an 
undue burden on Commanding Officers and officers in leadership positions," (Participant 
141).
"Advancement solely due to the accomplishment of social engineering goals has 
been the Navy’s biggest leadership problem,” (Participant 52).
Tailhook.
Many Vietnam-era veterans had strong feelings about Tailhook and how senior 
Navy leadership M ed the entire Navy by their inept handling of the crisis and their 
displayed lack of courage. Because o f the great number of survey responses about 
Tailhook, the researcher chose 12 comments to demonstrate the breadth of passion that 
Vietnam-era veterans had about the event.
"We need to take back from congress and staffs responsibility for those matters 
clearly within our purview. The acquiescence allowing congressional black balling o f 
promotional selectees with perceived Tailhook taint was shameful No senior leadership 
agreed with it but none had the courage to stand and put a career on the line. I am 
ashamed o f these so-called leaders.' Their cowardly actions (or inactions) left seeds that 
we are reaping even now," (Participant 212).
"Tailhook—Senior leadership seemed clueless, naval aviator participants placed a 
lot more importance on being aviators than on being naval officers," (Participant 94).
"Political nature of nations leaders will always have a direct effect upon [the]
Navy," (Participant 415).
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"Leadership—how Navy reacts and stands-up to dramatic changes like Tailhook 
can dramatically affect leadership," (Participant 332).
"The Tailhook ‘witch-hunt’ seriously degraded upper level Navy leadership 
confidence," (Participant 55).
"As an avid naval history buff and subscriber to die Naval Institute Proceedings. I 
am appalled by the overall timidity of the senior naval flag cadre in general on unpleasant 
issues such as women in combat, Tailhook mishandling., and the erosion of naval aviation 
in general. I hope your survey falls on some responsive ears somewhere!" (Participant 
209).
"What disappoints me to read/hear [is] that some still believe that a 'warrior' must 
act like a dog in heat. An Officer & Gentleman must be both a warrior & a gentleman. No 
amount o f excuses can change that. And--it is a Sr. officer’s responsibility to control his 
‘troops.' Failure to accept that responsibility was a serious breech o f faith by many at 
Tailhook. It was criminal after Tailhook. In spite o f 26 yrs service, I was ashamed to admit 
my Navy background for 5 yrs after because o f that failure," (Participant 17).
"Tailhook was mishandled by Navy leadership. They should have hammered the 
relatively small number of guilty and moved on. They, however, let it simmer  for years," 
(Participant 108).
"I retired in 1992 after Tailhook & Clinton’s election. I am an USNA ‘73 grad and 
saw the leadership in the Navy abandon its officers because of the political atmosphere. 
Many o f my classmates followed suit after 20 years o f service," (Participant 230).
"The failure of upper Flag leadership following Tailhook was classic. Cover your 
ass and feed the JOs (up to Sqd. [squadron] CMDR) to the wolves. While admirals hid
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from congress and were desiccated by Pat Schroeder and her fellows in congress/media. 
Leadership should have proclaimed 'we’ll clean our own house' and damn the reaction. I 
was an 0-4  with 154 combat missions Vietnam *71-*73," (Participant 69).
"During John Lehman’s tenure as Secretary o f the Navy, Navy leadership was at 
its highest point. Flag officers could get support for creative leadership. Morale was high, 
and training budgets and op tempos were supported. After Lehman, Navy operations did 
not get the same support. Leadership in Washington became more & more political, until 
the collapse of moral courage in 1991 following [the] Tailhook: scandal," (Participant 
144).
"The Tailhook incident and the rise o f women in the Navy have totally undermined 
mutual trust and confidence. If  I were on active duty today, I wouldn’t trust any woman— 
and I certainly wouldn’t go on liberty with her—no exceptions!" (Participant 195).
"Senior Navy leadership let us down after Tailhook. Perception is that they did 
what was good for their careers instead of what was best for the Navy. (The one notable 
exception was ADM Stan Arthur. He was cashiered for his trouble, but if other four star 
admirals had followed his lead the Navy would be better off today.) That, phis the forced 
inclusion o f women in combat units have dealt morale a severe blow," (Participant 206).
Leadership similar to Civilian Management.
Many Vietnam-era veterans expressed that Navy leadership was more like civilian 
management than leadership. They viewed that as a detractor to Navy leadership. The 
following five comments demonstrate this point.
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"The concept that TQL is wonderful is for corporate America—not the military— 
This is no Democracy and it isn’t a social proving ground. Somebody had better get some 
spine before it’s totally destroyed!!" (Participant 410).
"Today’s leadership: starting with CNO, is based on 'Managership.' Managers do 
things right. Leaders do the right thing, regardless of the consequences, moral or physical. 
Moral courage is always required in leadership situations. Physical courage is 'scenario or 
battle dependent' & usually spontaneous. To ALWAYS stand-up for what is right, 
regardless o f the consequences or politics, is difficult and courageous. To be a 
spontaneous, Battle Field Hero, is often achieved without thought, without conviction & 
without courage,” (Participant 165).
"Emphasis on business management vice people leadership hit hard in early ‘90s 
and has continued to grow. Value placed on managers vice leaders. The Navy is 
increasingly led by managers vice true leaders," (Participant 177).
"Today’s Navy seems to be more interested in turning out managers than leaders. 
The warrior ethic has been totally removed from all the services—especially the Navy," 
(Participant 134).
Post-Cold War Drawdown.
The po st-Cold War drawdown was commented on by some Vietnam-era veterans 
as having a negative effect on the Navy and Navy leadership. The following three 
comments illustrate this point.
"I felt that the Zumwalt changes put the Navy on a downward trend from which it 
may not recover due to the compound effects of social engineering and the Cold War 
drawdown,” (Participant 182).
145
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory
"Drawdown—Senior leadership foiled to recognize how horribly damaging it was 
to throw out good, dedicated people, or live under the threat of involuntary termination. I 
thought that Navy leadership showed absolutely no backbone during the drawdown. They 
did not madft the argument against the drastic reductions and morale and readiness is 
suffering," (Participant 234).
"The loss o f Russia as our 1 enemy caused the military to lack focus on its world 
mission," (Participant 399).
Why Leadership Has Changed.
Some Vietnam-era veterans offered different opinions about leadership and how 
and why it changed. The three comments below articulate this position.
"I knew things had changed roughly 10 years ago when I observed that USNA 
Superintendent Tom Lynch had a lieutenant as his 'ethics officer,' to advise him on ethics.
It used to be the admirals that advised the JOs on ethics—not the other way around. The 
Tailhook incident merely revealed the degree to which 0-5s and above had M ed in their 
duty to set the moral and legal tone for their subordinates," (Participant 412).
"Leadership changes probably started during the Vietnam era as the military fought 
a war that was directed by the politicians, or more specifically, micromanaged by 
politicians. These politicians had little sensitivity to what they were asking of their troops 
and no responsibility. Courage, both moral and physical, should be a part of leadership, 
but people with these attributes have been passed over, emasculating a majority of naval 
leaders," (Participant 210).
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"New young leaders are not taught Duty, Honor, Country. They are taught global
muMculturalism. Respect for authority does not exist in feet because it is not deserved.. .in 
part because it is not taught in schools. We are in trouble!" (Participant 160). 
leadership Training.
Some Vietnam-era veterans expressed the importance o f leadership training. The 
following three comments illustrate this point.
"Leadership training is important. There will always be a changing environment. 
Real leaders are always in fevor o f continued training. Every rate and rank level needs the 
training," (Participant 199).
"The issues of leadership in the uniformed service have always been clear. 
However, teaching some of those principles is important. Reinforcement helps," 
(Participant 78).
"I applaud the efforts o f the leadership continuum—essential but not sufficient. 
More needs to be done at the operational command level," (Participant 40).
Post-Vietnam Survey Comments
The following is a summary o f the comments section o f the surveys provided by 
post-Vietnam veterans. As with the Vietnam-era comments, select entire comments are 
used to present a more complete picture o f the responses.
Senior Leadership.
Many post-Vietnam veterans expressed concern about senior Navy leadership and 
the direction leadership is taking the Navy. To present a more complete view of what 
active duty Navy personnel are thinking about Navy leadership, the researcher felt a great
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number o f comments needed to be shown. Therefore, the following eight comments are
provided.
"Naval leadership is in a near-abysmal condition. While Tailhook served to 'rock' 
the world, the aftermath effect on perceptions of navy leadership (and its M ures) has been 
properly characterized as extreme. Modifications to leadership values in an attempt to 
accommodate 'political correctness' and TQL have greatly reduced the quality and 
integrity of naval leadership. Additionally, the political scandals winch have plagued the 
current administration [Clinton Administration] continue to contribute to a definite sense 
of'double standards' and ethics lacking at the pinnacle o f leadership," (Participant 322).
"Navy needs some Admirals and civilians willing to resign rather than compromise 
their positions. Senior leadership takes care of themselves and blames others. Specifically, 
they blame their subordinates and turn junior officers and enlisted men and women into 
scapegoats,” (Participant 4).
"My time in the Navy is not long—11 years. I remember when I first joined—the 
idea o f accountability—taking responsibility for actions was stressed to me. A critical 
aspect of this was senior leaders taking the hit when things went wrong. This has changed.
I was involved hi the investigation and prosecution o f Tailhook cases—as a defense 
counsel. It was very clear that actions were taken at a  senior level to protect senior 
officers at the expense of JOs. That message was received, and has jaded JOs about their 
leaders concern and moral courage," (Participant 60).'
"Navy leadership is weak. The drawdown, Tailhook, the administration, and TQL 
also contributed to our weakness. TQL concepts and ideas work great in a homogenous
148
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Changes in Leadership Theory 
society such as Japan, but difficult in Armed Services where diversity and cultures are
different, such as our forces," (Participant 133).
"There does not appear to be any senior navy leader with the knowledge, charisma, 
and political skill necessary to regain the trust and confidence o f the president, congress 
and the people o f the United States—senior leadership is not in touch with most o f the 
Navy because of generational and experiential differences. The Navy has not been able to 
keep pace with the many social, economic, and technological changes in the last decade," 
(Participant 85).
"Navy leadership doesn’t have the courage to tell our civilian leadership what 
needs to be said," (Participant 22).
"I feel that naval leadership has a lot o f room to improve, especially at the division 
officer/department head leveL Taking care o f your people is just as important as putting 
your people to work, and the former is often ignored," (Participant 367).
"It seems leadership is based strictly on seniority and admin [administrative] ability. 
No longer does it appear that the Navy is training war fighters," (Participant 309).
Self-Serving Leaders.
Like many of the Vietnam-era veterans, post-Vietnam veterans too were 
concerned about self-serving leaders and what they have done and continue to do to the 
Navy. The following three comments best illustrate this concern.
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“No moral courage in senior leadership. Too much emphasis in being a
is
showboat,” (Participant 419).
"Too many senior officers concerned with their own political agendas—inside or 
outside the Navy—not with the good o f the service," (Participant 222).
“My impression o f senior leadership throughout the military is that too many of the 
senior leaders are more concerned with being politically correct yes men than they are 
about ensuring the military is ready to defend the nation. I’ve seen way too many good 
junior officers leave the Navy, people who probably would have made superb senior 
leaders, because o f poor leadership at the top. This leaves a cycle of poor leadership at the 
top because what’s left to advance is generally less than "the cream of the crop.' This can 
be said for all levels o f leadership in the military. This blanket statement is not true in all 
cases, but is really the rule & not the exception based on my experience," (Participant 
312).
Social Pressure.
Many post-Vietnam veterans felt that many leaders today have acquiesced to social 
pressures and are too timid to make the right decisions, or in some cases, any decision.
This conviction can be seen in the following four comments.
"In my opinion the senior leadership sometimes overreacts to political and or 
media pressure. That is when the moral courage to do the right thing must be enacted," 
(Participant 15).
18 The term “showboat” refers to leaders who are more concerned about their image and 
self-promotion than they are about the Navy.
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"The zero defect mentality is still very prevalent amongst senior leadership. This
mentality must be broken. We are forcing to many outstanding sailors out o f the Navy
19
with this attitude coming from senior positions,” (Participant 375).
"The Navy has lost all of its respect factor since most Navy leaders are fearful of 
being brought up on sexual harassment/racial discrimination/fraternization charges! This is 
not the same Navy I joined," (Participant 207).
"Our most senior leaders tend to be very timid and quite political in the 
Washington arena. Politics, a reality warriors must deal with, does not mean that we, as 
leaders, should sacrifice our ideals for.. .rather we need to choose our wars and have a 
united front so we can win.. .the political battles in the Washington arena are very real and 
have cost a few careers due to lack of moral courage. However, if our senior leaders 
would stand together and tell Congress how things realty are and be willing to retire en 
masse to drive home their courage. . .  Congress and the American people would listen," 
(Participant 315).
Leadership Training.
Some post-Vietnam veterans expressed views that the Navy is not training its 
leaders and others felt that Navy leadership training was not adequate. The following three 
comments are representative of these concerns.
19 Zero defect mentality is the notion that just one mistake at anytime in a career will end 
the career and keep one from advancing further. That notion was substantiated during the ‘90s 
when the Navy was running gun shy from Tailhook and other media enhanced incidents and it 
needed to cut back at all levels due to the post-CoId War drawdown.
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"The other mam concern is how fast we are pushing SWOs [surface warfare
officers] through the pipeline for command. I am sure they are trained but the truth will 
tell when the 'crap hits the fan.' We need to take the politics out of senior leadership and 
just train our people to be the best they can be and everything else will foil in place," 
(Participant 388).
"Leadership schools for Department Heads are a waste o f money and time with 
current curriculum," (Participant 93).
"There is a lot of talk about training our junior personnel, however, it seems to be 
a 'forced' learning environment, not a good teaching/mentoring environment," (Participant 
296).
Lack o f Vision.
Some post-Vietnam veterans felt that Navy leaders lacked vision. This belief can 
be seen in the comment below.
"My great complaint against our leadership over the past decade is lack o f vision, 
plus lack of insight as to how to make a vision into reality. Our utter failure to manage the 
drawdown bears testimony—the drawdown has managed us rather than the reverse. Look 
at us—15 years and not a single new aircraft design has reached the fleet. The only new 
sub design proved utterly unaffordable. Our surface fleet is aging and ill-maintained. I’m 
not saying I could do better, but I would like to see better from those we entrust with stars 
[admirals]," (Participant 21).
Leadership Training.
Many post-Vietnam veterans expressed dissatisfaction with Navy leadership and 
leadership training. The following four comments illustrate this point o f view.
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"Today’s leadership seems to be guided by a 'zero-defect' mentality. Appearances
are more important than actual capabilities. Technology is good, but it’s being crammed
down our throats at a rate that we can’t absorb," (Participant 118).
"For all the emphasis on leadership, effective leadership education remains poorly
implemented. There is a stark disconnect between leadership theory and practice,"
(Participant 426).
"Kinder/gentler Navy is not ALWAYS the best," (Participant 251).
"Current leadership schools are ineffective. They are too long and don’t have a
lasting effect. 1 believe large seminars of one or two days given by a professional speaker
along with a well-organized, easy to read manual would be more effective," (Participant
84).
"The turn that Navy leadership has taken has de-emphasized the authority o f senior
enlisted and officers. It’s hard to tell the difference between a new seaman or a fiy cook at
20
McDonalds. Same attitude,” (Participant 265).
Pleased W ith Naw Leadership.
Some post-Vietnam veterans were pleased with the direction Navy leadership and 
leadership training was heading. Because of the positive nature o f this perspective that is 
contrary to so many comments provided, seven comments are submitted for the reader.
20 This comment refers to the way Navy boot camp prepares sailors for the fleet and the 
way young sailors are indoctrinated in Navy life by their commands.
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"In my career I’ve seen the extreme to the most extreme (the other way). I’ve
taken the best & worst, compared them & come up w/ something that works and my 
people are happy & the job is getting done," (Participant 273).
"The changes in leadership I have encountered have been good. However, until we 
stop 'consuming' our workforce by demanding 70-100 hour workweeks, people will 
continue to jump ship. Why is that? Because there is a  life outside of the Navy that 
everyone should have a chance to live. Families are being broken [up] in the name o f 
readiness! Quality of Life . . .  no matter how you word it, it’s a lie!" (Participant 374).
"Overall Navy leadership is sound. That said, from the troop' level it often seems 
the ‘upper’ level brass tend to knee jerk and overreact from time-to-time to isolated 
events. Whatever the knee jerk response happens to be now becomes top priority 
regardless o f what else is going on," (Participant 10).
"Navlead [Navy leadership] courses have improved greatly in past 1 to 2 years. 
Finally keeping a updated view o f the Navy and our sailors," (Participant 77).
"The Command Leadership School in Newport, RI, is a positive step toward 
improving unit level (0-5) leadership," (Participant 366).
"The Navy that I am in today is a service I would be proud to have my daughter 
join. That was not true in 1983 when we drank ourselves silly, chased women and lied 
about readiness. Today’s NAVY is approaching a steady state level o f high professional 
standards and renewed respectability. We may be materially short of dollars, but at least 
the pride is back. We should never return to the old days (circa 1980)," (Participant 62).
"I feel that unit-level leadership (0-5) improved during my years but have seen a 
mixed bag at the senior level (0-6 and above)," (Participant 119).
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Marine Corps Leadership.
Some post-Vietnam veterans, like a  number of Vietnam-era veterans, felt that the 
Marine Corps did a better job of developing leaders. The comment below best illustrates 
this opinion.
"The Marine Corps has played second fiddle in the Department of the Navy for 
more than 200 years . . .  I think it is time we switched things around a bit and let the Navy 
play second fiddle for a while...under Marine Corps leadership. They seem to have a 
system o f developing leaders that is focused [on] leadership rather than technology or the 
other latest buzzwords. Naval leadership’s job is to lead and leadership does not mean 
new planes, ships, or computers, you can only lead people," (Participant 31).
Technology Impact.
Technology was considered a variable in leadership for many post-Vietnam 
veterans. Most of them felt that advances in communications technology had a negative 
impact on Navy leadership by breaking down the time-tested tenants of military leadership 
such as the chain of command. Because technology represents a new frontier for military 
leadership, the following seven comments are provided.
'1 am o f the opinion that the increase of connectivity is greatly reducing unit-level 
leadership. The near instantaneous ability (or misuse) o f transferring unit-level information 
real time has the negative effect of detracting from a CO’s ability to exercise independent 
thought or initiative. The operational aspects of this downplay (of critical decision making) 
at the unit level trickles over into the administrative running of a unit. I think this fosters a 
dependency on the ISIC [reporting senior] to solve or involve themselves in too much of a 
ships daily operation. This is to say that if I was so wrapped up in trying to inform and
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appease m y ISIC  in the daily administration and operations o f my vessel, how could I  ever 
be expected to function w/boldness prowess and initiative on my own at the tip o f the 
spear," (Participant 80).
"Navy leadership has been significantly impacted by the introduction of Internet 
and E-maiL The chain of command may no longer be as informed about issues because the 
chain no longer sees the issues," (Participant 301).
"Computers/email--makes it too easy to lead by email and not face-to-face," 
(Participant 401).
"Technology--with Internet connectivity, upper leadership has more of a hand in 
on site conflict. There is a great tendency towards micromanagement from upper levels!” 
(Participant 502).
Information Technology has made life easier and efficient in some cases; but we do 
less person-to-person interacting. We are managed by e-mail, there are less customer 
services and our leaders do not take care o f people. A corporate Navy of outsourcing and 
contracting services is a scary picture for a war fighting force that does not generate a 
profit for stock holders. The U.S. and taxpayers—get more than enough out of 
overworked and underpaid/under appreciated service members who continue to put their 
lives, family and long hours on the line to preserve our freedom and national interest 
despite our weak leaders," (Participant 154).
‘Technology—has enhanced C2 [command and control]. I believe technology has 
degraded leadership. Management by e-mail will kill us all. Nothing beats face-to-face 
leadership. Look ‘em in the eye and tell ‘em what you want," (Participant 161).
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"Naval leadership is changing, and is, in my opinion, opening its eyes to the
realities o f the world around it. Senior leadership is recognizing the need to stay aware and 
abreast o f the changing society it must draw personnel horn. Technology is also changing 
the way senior leadership is making decisions. Sometimes trying to keep up, we let the 
tools' get in the way of the job. Lastly, Naval leadership must remain focused on the 
■bottom line.' We’re war fighters and must be prepared to do what we’re paid to do," 
(Participant 172).
Political Correctness.
Some post-Vietnam veterans expressed concerns about political correctness, 
stating that it had a negative overall effect on the Navy and Navy leadership. The 
following four remarks are representative o f the survey comments.
"Too many 'touchy-feely' programs and policies. I believe in equality and process 
improvement. But discipline and a strong chain o f command have [been] sacrificed. Boot 
camp has softened. Evaluations/Fitreps [officer and chief petty officer performance 
evaluations] and promotions are more politically driven than [related to] skill/performance. 
Moral courage is voicing a concern, identifying a problem and fixing it when it’s 
unpopular to do so. Those with moral courage become blacklisted and their careers 
stagnant, while less competent, more politically aligned individuals excel. Many Navy 
traditions that built moral, unit bonding, and Navy pride have vanished due to peace-time 
public pressure. Navy training has suffered as well. We don’t train the way we fight, but 
we will fight the way we train, and that’s not something to be proud o f Tailhook was a 
single event where a handful of individuals were wronged. The majority was punished for 
the acts o f the few," (Participant 330).
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"Social experimentation in the military has greatly impacted leadership and
discipline in the Navy. When the military takes the lead to obviate behavior that is 
concurrent with the law of the land, Le., racial/sexual discrimination, the result is 
supportable morally & ethically. When this is not true and social experimentation is 
contrary to law of the land, as in sexual orientation driven from political desires, 
breakdown is inevitable. The leadership must remain in place to make decisions, but those 
decisions and discipline is counterproductive while the experiment is underway. We are 
doomed to fail!" (Participant 190).
"I think the Navy will be in a lot o f trouble when a war starts. All of these social 
PC' changes are going to come back to haunt us," (Participant 283).
"Leadership cannot be effective if it is too afraid o f offending a minority group, the 
opposite gender, etc. Too many leadership challenges are not handled properly because 
someone in the chain o f command is afraid of being accused o f sexual/other types o f 
harassment," (Participant 20).
Tailhook Wasn't Important
Tailhook was not as momentous for some post-Vietnam veterans as others, 
particularly more junior officers and senior enlisted personnel The four comments below 
best present this perspective.
"From my perspective, while Tailhook was a juicy media event, it did not have the 
impact on Naval Leadership change that either the post-Vietnam drawdown and Zumwalt 
experiments, or the post Cold War/Fall of Soviet Union had. The latter released a wave of 
crises that required the commitment ofU.S. forces abroad, in an era of shrinking Navy 
manpower. Result—increased deployments with less training, and more rapid turnarounds.
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How to manage these changes and lead our sailors through this is a current and continuing 
problem," (Participant 140).
"Tailhook was not a Navy catalyst for Navy leadership degrading. Only a few 
mishandled it. Always taught 'respect oneself and others' with dignity. The individual that 
will have an aura o f leadership if he or she respects others. It’s an old cliche 'No warriors 
need to apply during a peacetime Navy.' 'Managers only required.' We have lost the 
leadership philosophy The buck stops here.' We have officers and sailors wanting the 
responsibility but refusing to be held accountable for the responsibility gained,"
(Participant 420).
"I believe Tailhook did not affect Navy leadership at all It was just a political tool 
that the Navy used to cover high position officials. Leadership and Tailhook have nothing 
in common," (Participant 259).
"I’m a SWO. I don’t care about Tailhook. There are other, more important 
questions. If  I wasn’t up to my eyeballs with SWODOM, I’d list them for you. Maybe I
just did,"21 (Participant 184).
"Get off the Tailhook thing, let it die," (Participant 352).
Tailhook W as Significant.
Tailhook was a significant event for many post-Vietnam veterans. The four 
comments below illustrate this attitude.
21 SWODOM is slang for the world in which Surface Warfare Officers live.
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"Tailhook—Exposed gender discrimination. Embarrassing for senior leadership.
Created a  reverse discriminatory attitude towards women. Men seemed terrified to talk to
us because o f fear o f harassment suit," (Participant 90).
"Tailhook—Leadership did not deal with the issue decisively. The whole Navy
suffered from the actions of a few 'Officers & Gentlemen.1 Solution—Problems must be
dealt with immediately and move on. Navy leadership hasn’t  changed but merely reacted
with the social trend of the day," (Participant 14).
"Tailhook marked a turning point for how leadership handled major problems. We
still reel from this—note today’s reaction to how we handle readiness issues. Leadership
won’t stand up and say we don’t have enough money—we are trying to man a 12-carrier
navy with a 10-carrier budget," (Participant 337).
"I believe Navy leadership has changed since the Vietnam era mainly because of
the social climate in the country. Tailhook, I believe, shocked everybody in leadership
positions into realizing they were accountable for the actions o f their subordinates. This
revelation is not a had' thing. The bad side or fallout from all this, was that senior leaders
were getting 'axed,' Le., fired for things they allegedly did or did not do. The problem, as I
see it, is that senior leaders are given great responsibilities and held accountable (good
things) yet they are extremely constrained in their power to influence subordinate
behavior. One small example: a CO o f a squadron CANNOT prohibit squadron members
from dating other squadron members. Why not? In my current command we have just had
another female announce she is pregnant and she has been dating another squadron
member. She is now. ineligible for the rest of workups and deployment, as now someone
else will have to fill her spot and morale suffers. Why would I want to be a CO and have
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such little ability to enforce any rules I deemed appropriate to good order and discipline in 
my command?" (Participant 356).
T -eadership More Like Civilian Management.
Many post-Vietnam veterans expressed that Navy leadership was more like civilian 
management than leadership, citing that the Navy’s initiative toward management marked 
the change. The researcher chose the following five comments to demonstrate this 
outlook.
"TQL brought about significant modifications. The navy moved away from 
leadership to management (Le., TQM (Total Quality Management] vice TQL). 
Concentration on core leadership skills is and was lacking. Acquisition reform is good. 
Other TQM issues will certainly help. But, these are management not leadership issues. 
Leadership must not be dictatorial but engaged (ref. CNO and anthrax shots). We need to 
instill core values at all levels. We are not doing that," (Participant 304).
"My opinion is that in 20 years the Navy will look more like MSC (Microsoft 
Corporation) than you can image," (Participant 131).
'Micromanagement is a very strong management practice in the Navy. Too many 
managers and not enough leaders," (Participant 107).
"Navy life and Navy leadership seem to be compared to civilian life, and there 
seems to be an effort to make the Navy run more like a civilian organization. This is 
wrong—it’s not a civilian organization," (Participant 54).
"Navy leadership is too management focused. That is the adoption of TQM as 
TQL has one managing people. One cannot manage people, one can manage projects or 
processes, but people must be led by example physically and morally," (Participant 117).
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Post-Cold War Drawdown.
The post-CoId War drawdown was a major event for many post-Vietnam-era 
veterans, and was viewed as having a negative effect on the Navy by promoting a zero- 
defect mentality, careerism, and politics within the Navy’s ranks. Because o f the side- 
efifect that many active duty personnel attributed to the drawdown and its importance to 
senior Navy leadership, the researcher felt the following seven comments needed to be 
provided to present the foil impact o f the post-Cold War downsizing.
"The drawdown has affected leadership because there has become too much 
politicking for careers. Money and career protection become overriding factors," 
(Participant 311).
"The Cold War ended and the country wanted to spend less on the militaty. 
Downsizing occurred. This caused the competition among officers and CPOs to increase 
dramatically. The competitiveness generated a bunch o f ass kissing, so that the senior 
personnel could be assured advancement in rate/rank. No one could afford to piss off their 
CO or OIC because a bad mark on a fitrep would permanently screw their chances for 
advancement. This ass kissing, evident to the blue shirts, generated a huge group of 
gutless leadership and is still having a detrimental impact to our Navy. Chiefs do not run 
their divisions any more—they wait to be told what to do and are not proactive. This 
activity causes a loss o f retention as the junior sailors see that their direct boss is not in 
control of their destiny. These weak leaders and this trend started 8 years ago and now 
these guys are the Master Chiefs and 0-5s who are not Navy leaders but in the CO/CMC 
[command master chief] position! This combined with the implement o f TQL—and the 
kinder/gentler bullshit is killing my Navy," (Participant 382).
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"The stigma caused by downsizing is still felt by today’s leadership. There are still 
a lot o f leaders who try to outdo other leaders rather than work together as a team. It goes 
the same between officers and enlisted. Some junior officers, in their effort to impress 
senior leaders would lower themselves as workers or managers. They tend to lose their 
focus on a much bigger picture. Officers should refocus and be leaders again. They should 
leave the rest to senior enlisted men (Chiefs!)," (Participant 280).
"Navy leadership is going downhill because senior leaders are trying to please 
everybody! PC in boot camp! I don’t think so. Plus, senior leadership is only concerned 
about making the next higher rank, not about those who work for them (in general)," 
(Participant 105).
"The Navy today seems to be a continuous paperwork production company and 
everyone is out for themselves at the leadership levels we speak of. If  everyone came up 
through the ranks there would be more organization, proficiency, and working 
relationships would be tolerable. My experience with leaders today is just that. Those 
below you to do your job and if something goes wrong find someone to blame. The Navy 
has become a chore, no longer an adventure. Root canals are more interesting, they seem 
at least to be more fun," (Participant 68).
"I feel that Navy leaders have their hands tied in many situations because of 
politics and publicity. Senior officers worry about being put in the lime light over issues 
that would not necessarily be noticed in the civilian world. I do think that a positive 
change has occurred with regards to equal opportunity for leaders because the 'Good Old 
Boy1 network is not as tolerated by seniors. Recognition is a key to good leadership. If our
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sailors feel their job isn’t  worthwhile then we continue to fail as leaders," (Participant 
218).
"Submarine community— leadership emphasizes engineering prowess over
warfighting. I see efforts at leveling the playing held, but the 'nuke'ism o f the sub force is a
source o f heartache for many JOs. More specifically, the zero tolerance for mistakes
mentality of nuclear engineering carries over to other facets o f Navy life. I plan to stay in
the Navy because I see concrete efforts o f my leadership at improving quality of life and
22
taking care of people," (Participant 51).
Cumulative Events.
Some post-Vietnam veterans expressed that neither Tailhook nor the drawdown 
contributed significantly to changes in Navy leadership. The following three comments 
illustrate this point o f view.
"Navy leadership did not change overnight. It is significantly different than the 
Vietnam era, but it is constantly changing and always slowly evolving. It is a combination 
o f Navy needs, Navy traditions, and a different attitude and outlook of a new generation 
o f young sailors. It is comprised not only o f moral and physical courage, but of the mental 
courage to challenge oneself the social coinage to stand for what you believe in, and the 
emotional co- rage to carry yourself and your subordinates through the tough times and 
still cultivate positive attitudes. Leadership is all about people," (Participant 345).
22 “Nuke” ism, like SWODOM, is slang for nuclear trained personnell whose actions are 
heavily regulated by rules and a zero defect mentality that derived from the zero tolerance for 
mistakes vis-a-vis nuclear power.
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"I think our society’s attitudes and opinions about things have changed because of 
many, many local, national, and intranational events. These changes in the fabric o f our 
society lead to the changes in leadership. You can’t put everything on Tailhook, or the 
drawdown, they are not all inclusive events that caused changes. I think to an extent 
Tailhook was an effect o f the changes that had already taken place in society and acted as 
a catalyst for causing changes in the military that had already begun in society,"
(Participant 262).
"Navy leadership has changed over the decades as generations have encountered 
different socio-economic conditions combined with past events, i.e., Tailhook and the 
drawdown. People are different—times are different and we must adapt to their views and 
thoughts on a wide array of issues. I think the basic concept of Navy leadership should not 
change it’s just that people have evolved and changed over the decades," (Participant 87).
Meaning o f  "Warrior"
Some post-Vietnam respondents questioned the use o f the term "warrior" in the 
survey while others appeared to have a definition of the term in mind. Three comments are 
provided as representative of this perspective.
"Warriors—Assumption; Warriors are combat vets. Moral and physical courage are 
required for leadership in peace & war. I believe combat leaders have a better appreciation 
for results (achievements) as opposed to how those results were attained. Combat leaders 
tend to steer their juniors towards initiative/action vice waiting for guidance and 
management," (Participant 29).
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"One doesn’t  have to be a  staff officer and lose the warrior outlook, many of ours
have done that. The most important quality in a leader is the taking care o f his troops! If 
that fails, all else is useless and futile," (Participant 3).
"Basic—More warriors, fewer bureaucrats = Better leadership. This isn’t rocket 
science," (Participant 41).
Naw is Too Political.
Some post-Vietnam veterans felt that the Navy in general was too political. The 
following four comments express this perspective.
"Leadership in the upper ranks has always and will continue to be too political In 
aviation, if you don’t fly a pointy nosed jet, then your chances of being an Admiral or 
CNO are minimal as with most other choices (CVN CO [carrier CO], CVW CO [carrier 
air wing commander], etc.). I do believe the leadership has become stronger than it was in 
the past; however, the leadership training and requirements always seem to be in constant 
change," (Participant 124).
"Navy leaders are forced to 'play the game' both for their own careers and their 
people. This is an obvious and well-known problem, but no one seems to have a solution 
for it," (Participant 94).
"In my short experience, it seems to me that Navy leadership is generally more 
concerned with how it looks rather than how it acts. Standing your time worrying about 
how you appear causes you to spend less time on what you should actually be doing, Le., 
training to fight," (Participant 61).
"With the fight for promotions (which are scarce) senior leadership is not voicing 
the strain it is on personnel to do more with less. Instead, senior leadership in the attempt
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to further their careers, are striving to impress their supervisors by trying to do even more 
with less. These same leaders are also using Navy personnel and resources for superfluous 
and unnecessary personal luxuries causing more hardship for the common sailor. Junior 
officers most often follow the lead by brown nosing and apple polishing because 
performance does not outweigh presentation and ass kissing," (Participant 295).
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